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The military and the arrogance of power 
The Indonesian military is accustomed to ruling the country and enjoying political and economic 
power. The habit has turned soldiers into a special breed with all the characteristics of a ruling 
elite: arrogant, power crazy, greedy. General Wiranto 's recent outburst at the ad hoc court on 
East Timor says it all. Showing no remorse, he blamed the destruction of East Timor in 
September 1999 on the UN, not on the barbaric acts of his own men. 
For a brief period following the downfall of Suharto, the 
armed forces (TNI), in particular the army, was in a state of 
limbo. Having committed grave human rights violations, its 
image was gravely tarnished, forcing them to step back to 
make way for civilian rule. But within months of the elec-
tion of Abdurrachman Wahid as president, some groups had 
started obstructing his administration. In the closing months 
of his brief reign, the military were in open revolt, parading 
in front of the palace. His successor Megawati took over 
with army and police backing, a clear sign that TNI-AD, the 
army, was back in the saddle and determined to stay there. 
On the offensive 
Several events in February and March signalled a big 
political offensive by the military, displaying their determi-
nation to grab back what they had briefly lost. First, was the 
decision of highly-placed military and police officers to 
refuse to be questioned in an investigation into the riots in 
Jakarta in 1998 and 1999 and the killing of student demon-
strators. Next was the establishment of a new territorial 
military command in Aceh, Kodam Iskandar Muda, despite 
big protests in Jakarta and Banda Aceh. Then the TNI lead-
ership arrogantly appointed two notorious human rights 
violators into strategic positions; Major-General Syafrie 
Syamsuddin became official spokesperson of the armed 
forces and Major-General Muchdi PR became Deputy of 
BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, the revamped State 
Intelligence Body). 
In April retired General Wiranto and the still-serving 
Major-General Adam Damiri appeared in court as witnesses 
at the ad hoc court on the disastrous events in East Timor in 
1999. Although the world had seen how the Indonesian 
military and their proxy, the militias, plunged East Timor in 
an orgy of terror and destruction, these generals used the 
courtroom to make an unprecedented attack on the UN in 
East Timor, blaming it for the destruction. 
These are examples of how army officers have shown 
utter contempt for civilian rule. Looking back in history to 
the birth of the Republic in 1945, the military have played a 
dominant role in political decision making throughout, with 
the exception of the 1950s, the period of liberal democracy, 
and the two years after the fall of Suharto from 1998 till 
2000. Both these periods of civilian rule were ridden with 
secessionist moves and political instability. It has become 
second nature for most army officers to regard civilian rule 
as ineffective as compared with the military who are the 
'divine rulers', or 'saviours of the nation'. 
Protecting NKRI 
There are strong grounds to believe that the army's swift 
return to the centre stage of politics is largely due to 
Indonesia's woeful political and economic condition. In 
many countries, the collapse of an authoritarian regime has 
been followed by a long period of instability and disinte-
gration. The upsurge of the independence movements in 
Aceh and West Papua is now the main justification for the 
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army to step forward and involve themselves directly in 
decision making. Civilian politicians are seen as being too 
ineffective and liable to gives the separatists too much 
leeway. 
For a brief period during the reformasi period, when 
civil society was vibrant, a handful of public-spirited army 
officers drew up an agenda for reform of the TNI, accepting 
the principle of civilian supremacy but this reform wing 
soon collapsed, as the result of sabotage and obstruction 
from fellow officers. 
By mid-2001 the military were back at the helm, deter-
mining the composition of Megawati's cabinet. The key 
members of her cabinet are influential 
army officers. Lt. General 
Hendropriyono heads the state intelli-
gence agency, BIN, with a seat in the 
cabinet, Lt General Hari Sabamo is the 
interior minister and General Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono is the coordinat-
ing minister for politics and security 
affairs. These appointments signalled 
that reformasi was already dead. 
During the Habibie and Wahid 
periods, there was a significant push 
towards civilian supremacy, which 
also gave democratic space for the 
spectacular growth of the pro-referen-
dum movement in Aceh and the birth 
of the Papuan Presidium Council with 
independence demands on its agenda. 
The TNI used the threat of separatism 
as justification to re-enter politics, and 
teed a share for the military. Up to the bitter end most mili-
tary factions supported Suharto. 
But now, nominal civilian rule has replaced the authori-
tarian pyramid constructed under Suharto, with new groups 
of politicians in the executive and the legislature. They have 
been able to build their own power bases and grab every 
business opportunity in sight. The free-for-all fight for 
economic resources in the post-Suharto period led to 
another orgy of corruption and plunder, involving old and 
new cronies and creating a new layer of mostly civilian 
nouveau riche. The military top had hardly any share of the 
cake, fuelling more discontent with the new civilian elite. 
At the same time the dire economic situation could not 
provide an adequate budget for a 
professional armed forces, 
encouraging the military to get 
involved in organised crime and 
rackets. 
Politically speaking, the young 
plural party system is in a mess. 
All the major parties are split into 
at least two wings, and fighting 
publicly over political issues and 
economic gains. Although some 
retired generals have joined 
parties, the majority are reluctant 
to do so. This mirrors the early 
fifties when political officers and 
andiri officers also were part of 
the political constellation. 
The political generals 
enjoyed the tacit support of broad 
sections of the public where the 
concept of NKRI, the unitary state, is 
deeply ingrained. In the name o 
protecting NKRI, the TNI started to conduct 
massive military operations in Aceh and West 
Papua without noticeable protest in parliament. 
There are significant differ-
ences among the political generals 
[n strategy and approach. Retired 
President Megawati and the generals General Wiranto, one of the main 
decision makers up to early 2000, is 
a typical exponent of this group but functions outside the 
formal system. Everyone knows that his contacts with the 
Suharto family are close, giving him access to plenty of 
The two wings in the military 
With the collapse of the reformasi wing, TNI officers 
now mainly consist of two wings: the political wing and the 
mandiri (self-reliant) wing. While there are clear differ-
ences between the two groups, they basically agree on the 
army's 'divine rule', the ineffectiveness of civilian politi-
cians and the TNI's guardian role for the state. This found 
clear expression in Megawati's working program: 'To 
defend the unification and unity of the nation in the frame-
work of the Unitary State oflndonesia (NKRI).' 
One could argue that there are good grounds for feeling 
frustrated with the achievements of Indonesia's civilian 
political elite. Civilian rule under Habibie, Wahid and 
Megawati has not successfully promoted the principle of 
civilian supremacy. Gradually Indonesia has become one of 
the world's 'failing states', characterised by corruption, 
mismanagement, disintegration and the inability to build 
democratic institutions. In such conditions, the TNI appears 
to be the only institution able to hold the country together. 
Indonesia is now reckoned to be the most corrupt coun-
try in Asia, even surpassing Vietnam and China. During the 
orgy of personal plunder in the final years of the Suharto 
period, the bureaucracy-military partnership always guaran-
~oney. While Wiranto represents the voice of many 
disgruntled officers who have lost the political and 
economic clout they enjoyed in the post-Suharto era, their 
real influence in politics is limited. Wiranto himself has a 
high profile in the media, on TV and radio and uses bribes 
to get interviewed. He deals primarily with the closing years 
of Suharto, when there was much turbulence and ABRI 
later renamed TNI, gained a very negative image. As th~ 
then commander-in-chief, Wiranto must take responsibility 
for the many atrocities in the second half of the nineties. His 
line of defence is predictable: it was all done in the line of 
duty and the military were simply functioning as public 
servants. 
The other wings _of the political generals are more up 
!ront and have remamed part of the political system. Two 
important officers, now cabinet ministers should be 
mentioned: Lt-General Hendropriyono, who' heads BIN 
(see below) a_nd _Gener.al. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY), co-ordmatmg mm1ster for political and security 
affairs. 
. SBY_ is typical of t_he TNI officers involved in daily poli-
tics, which was so widespread during the Suharto era. His 
image is very respectable; he was a cabinet minister under 
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Wahid and now under Megawati. He is in effect the prime 
minister because the president is indecisive and says very 
little. In public at least, he is seen as the one who has deter-
mined policies regarding Aceh and West Papua and who 
coordinated the peace talks in Malino on the Poso and 
Maluku conflicts. · 
He clearly has political ambitions. The confusion that 
reigned under Wahid prompted him to find alternatives. 
After refusing an invitation to join Wahid's party, he set up 
a new party which includes former stalwarts of GOLKAR, 
the government party under Suharto. This party hopes to 
emerge as an alternative, a new military-bureaucracy coali-
tion. Other parties set up by retired generals have failed to 
win significant support. The SBY alternative is banking on 
a further decay in day-to-day politics under Megawati and 
then emerge strongly in the 2004 elections. 
The mandiri group 
While most retired officers are accustomed to being 
active in politics, most active officers, in particular those 
who run Cilangkap, the Indonesian Pentagon, have devel-
oped a different approach. While the older generation, the 
so-called political generals, still function as members of 
parliament, provincial governors or mayors, the present 
generation have structurally said goodbye to the idea of 
holding public office. 
In contrast to his seniors like SBY or Wiranto, army 
chief of staff General Endriartono Sutarto, sees things 
differently. In his own words, the army's main task is to 
guarantee national sovereignty and protect the country 
against the danger of disintegration, in effect, a declaration 
of war on separatism. The best examples of the mandiri 
group are Endriartono Sutarto himself and Lt-General 
Ryamizard Ryacudu, a no-nonsense general who prefers 
military action to words. While Endriartono needs to be 
careful about what he says, Ryacudu functions as the 
spokesperson of the group. 'The army has always been on 
the losing side', he laments. 'Even during the New Order, we 
always came last. Can you imagine, we only received a 
fraction of the state budget (around 3 per cent). It was only 
when General Yusuf was Minister of Defence (1978-1983) 
that the allocation was adequate. After that, never again" 
[Tempo, 7 April 2002]. 
His views on reformasi are clear: the reform measures 
are in disarray. Reflecting the views of most soldiers, he 
says. 'The reform programme did not proceed as expected. 
Each one went their own way.' [Garda, 3 March 2002]. He 
openly criticises fellow officers who joined the ranks of 
reformasi and got infected with the disease of reform and 
democracy. But 95 per cent of the troops still hold firmly to 
the TNI identity, according to the general. It is clear that the 
mandiri stalwarts have nothing but contempt for civilians 
and showed open defiance of President Wahid. While the 
army remained on the sidelines during the moves to over-
throw Wahid, their open defiance of Wahid's policies gave 
the signal to other political forces to start impeachment 
proceedings. 
Kostrad and Kopassus 
Ryarnizard Ryacudu is the commander of Kostrad, the 
Army Strategic Command, the backbone of Kotama 
(Komando Utama, Main Command Forces) and the main 
command force of the army. Kostrad has 40,000 well 
trained troops and takes the lead in fighting armed GAM 
units in Aceh. As a leading exponent of the mandiri wing, 
Ryacudu is driven by the fear of Indonesia falling apart. 
The other force in Kotama is Kopassus, the special 
forces with around 7,000 men. In the turbulent period from 
1998 to 2000 Kopassus was widely condemned for its role 
in kidnappings and other serious human rights violations 
including torture and disappearances but in 2001 Kopassus 
made a comeback. For a while there was bitter rivalry 
between Kostrad and Kopassus officers but it seems that 
Kostrad has once again taken the lead in Kotama. 
In Aceh, during the DOM period from 1989 till 1998, 
qDi ' , ~ 
l 
Kopassus led the counter insurgency operations against 
GAM. A condition of low intensity conflict w·as maintained, 
resulting in grave human rights violations in the country-
side. After a brief pause, military operations were resumed 
on an even larger scale in 2001, with Kostrad as the main 
combat force. Now, Kostrad and Kopassus work hand in 
hand in Aceh. 
Some new elements have emerged in dealing with the 
problems in conflict areas. The practice now is to use a 
combination of elite forces, including marines, air force 
commandos and Kopassus troops, against separatists or 
armed groups in Poso or Maluku. Together with Kostrad 
units, these 'joint battalions' (yongab), Brimob troops (the 
special command unit of the police force), are also taking 
part. By the end of 2001 about 50 battalions from the TNI 
and the police were deployed across the nation in trouble 
spots. While several battalions are deployed in eastern 
Indonesia (West Papua, Maluku and Sulawesi), most of the 
joint battalions are deployed in Aceh, where the TNI faces 
the most serious challenge. 
Another new element in the war against separatist forces 
is the specially trained combat intelligence units called 
tontaikam (peleton pengintai keamanan, security surveil-
lance platoon). These units are trained and groomed at the 
Kopassus training centre in Batudjadjar and are responsible 
for reconnaissance and intelligence work in trouble spots 
ahead of military operations. The activities of tontaikam are 
directly felt by the population in Aceh where around a 
dozen people die every day. While there has been consoli-
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dation within Kotama, other TNI structures are beginning to 
re-emerge. 
Kotama's military operations against GAM have been 
quite successful. The armed wing of GAM has been pushed 
back to the mountains while OPM activities in West Papua 
are hardly noticeable. But as conflicts in other parts of the 
world show, mi litary might does not solve anything and 
only creates more violence. The idea that GAM can be 
obliterated is an illusion and has only increased its popular-
ity among the Acehnese. The death toll in 2001 reached 
1, 700, largely due to intensified war operations by Kotama 
troops. 
The territorial structure 
For some time there was confusion about the decisions 
of an important TNI seminar regarding the future of the 
territorial structure. One decision was to hand over the mili-
tary territorial structure to local governments. Some far-
reaching ideas were floated about abolishing military struc-
tures below sub-district level. [ Gatra, 1 September 2001]. 
In discussions outside the TNI, academics and military 
watchers agreed that the military territorial structure should 
be gradually dismantled. 
The territorial structure functions as a shadow govern-
ment, often more powerful than the regional administration. 
The territorial structure or koter (komando teritorial) was 
initially the foundation of the Indonesian army. In the early 
days of the young republic, military units were primarily 
organised in regional battalions and officers were identified 
by their territorial affinity. After a big overhaul in 1984, 
kotama forces, Kostrad and Kopassus became the backbone 
of the army. Financial constraints transformed the territorial 
commands into cesspools of criminal activities. Regional 
commands increasingly involved themselves in mafia prac-
tices instead of concentrating on security matters. 
The separation of the police from the TNI strengthened 
the view among civilians that koter had become redundant. 
The police are now responsible for Jaw and order. The 
downgrading of the position of Kaster (Kepala Staf 
Teritorial, chief of staff of territorial affairs) into an assis-
tant position at the general staff was another indication that 
territorial affairs would be sidelined. 
But in the end, the results were very different, with a big 
victory for the military. Instead of downsizing koter, the 
army top is determined to maintain or enlarge the territorial 
structure. Lt. General Ryamizard Ryacudu bluntly told a 
journalist: 'Like it or not, the glue of the nation nowadays is 
the TNI. If people want to dismantle the state, go ahead and 
abolish the territorial units. If the Trikora military command 
in Irian Jaya were dissolved, Irian Jaya would be indepen-
dent' [Tempo, 7 April 2002]. 
The new military territorial command in Aceh, Kodam 
(military area command) Iskandar Muda set up in February 
2002 is the latest example of the army's determination to 
expand rather than downsize koter. In May 1999, Kodam 
Pattimura was re-established in Maluku while two other 
kodams, Tanjung Pura in West Kalimantan and Lambung 
Mangkurat in Central and South Kalimantan are in the 
pipeline. With the creation of new provinces, a string of 
new districts and subdistricts are emerging. The TNI 
Information Centre recently said this might lead to the 
creation of new district and subdistrict military commands. 
Since the establishment ofkodams in Maluku andAceh, 
military operations have continued in both regions, primar-
ily by kotama forces under the command of the headqu~r­
ters in Jakarta. The operations in Aceh are run by a spe~1al 
command called Kolakops, similar to the military operation 
in East Timor while operations in Maluku are in the hands 
of Yongab, the joint battalions. 
The real reason for the expansion of the territorial 
commands lies elsewhere. Firstly, finances. Territorial 
commands can siphon off money from the provincial 
budget. In particular the autonomy law can, in practice, 
provide more money for the regions. Regional 'projects' like 
offering protection for local companies or vital projects can 
be co-ordinated by the command through a special unit 
called PAM Provit (Pasukan Pengamanan Projek Vital, 
Troo s Securing Vital Projects). 
--~~~~~~~~~-
President Megawati and the military, West Java 
So-called self-financing by the military can for a great 
part function through the local commands. Lack of funding 
by the state is used to justify efforts to find other sources of 
money. Local businesses have become more viable thanks 
to the autonomy law. The territorial commands can play a 
crucial role in these business activities. A more sinister role 
for commands is the recruitment and deployment of militia 
groups in conflict areas. Despite the disastrous experience 
in East Timor, the military top continue to consider militia 
groups as part of their security doctrine. Increasing the 
number of territorial commands is another example of how 
the military have gained leverage over civilian politics. 
The intelligence agency 
While kotama and koter are primarily in the hands of the 
mandiri group, the intelligence community is a much more 
complex entity. Retired General Hendropriyono, the new 
intelligence supremo, is an important exponent of the polit-
ical generals and is often at loggerheads with the mandiri 
generals. Since the start of civilian rule in the post-Suharto 
era, the need was felt to reorganise the intelligence agencies 
and bring them under overall control. The several intelli-
gence outfits functioned as small empires and have became 
the playground for influential officers or politicians. At one 
point President Wahid felt that he could no longer rely on 
information from the intelligence services and decided to 
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have his own private intelligence outfit. 
Reorganisation of the military and civilian intelli-
gence agencies started in April 1999 when the notorious 
military intelligence body BIA was reorganised and 
renamed BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis, Strategic 
Intelligence Agency). The police intelligence and the 
intelligence service of the defence ministry were also 
overhauled. Then, BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara, State 
Intelligence Agency) emerged and Hendropriyono was 
appointed its chief when Megawati announced her cabi-
net in July 2001. The retired general was given a seat in 
the cabinet and his role can be compared to the director of 
the National Security Council at the White House, a 
pivotal decision-making job. Previously the head of 
BAKIN (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen, Coordinating Body 
of the Intelligence) was the president's top advisor on 
intelligence matters but functioned like a sphinx. 
Hendropriyono functions much more openly, not unlike 
the high profile of national security advisors in 
Washington like Kissinger, Brzezinski and Condoleeza 
Rice. 
When Hendropriyono accepted the job, he knew he 
would need to revamp the entire intelligence structure 
and promised 'to repair our intelligence world so that we 
Lt Gen Hendropriyono, chief of BIN 
produce better intelligence data" (Jakarta Post, 10 August 
2001). Hendropriyono is a typical political general in the 
mould of General Wiranto. His background as an intelli-
gence operator and ruthless Kopassus combat soldier, has 
ensured a successful career but also many enemies. A highly 
ambitious man, he joined Megawati's party, the PDI-P, so as 
to have the ear of the president. Mandiri generals at TNI 
headquarters openly disagree with him and prefer the old 
structures where military intelligence was dominant. 
While Hendropriyono's achievements are not impres-
sive, the 11 September events shook the intelligence 
community profoundly. There has been an increase in 
contacts with intelligence agencies abroad, including the 
CIA and MI6 but is it not known whether BIN agents are 
being trained abroad to improve their lamentable skills. For 
Hendropriyono the 11 September tragedy provided the 
pretext to join the Bush bandwagon in his crusade against 
terrorism. In October Hendropriyono claimed that Al Qaeda 
units were training in South Sulawesi, echoing statements 
by the hawks in Washington and by Singapore's senior 
politician Lee Kuan Yew who complained that not enough 
has been done to track down potential extremist groups in 
Indonesia. But statements by Indonesian ministers contra-
dict Hendropriyono's claims and deny that there is any 
evidence of terrorist activities in the country. 
The conflict between Hendropriyono and the mandiri 
generals is growing. The suggestion that the US should send 
troops to Indonesia is very controversial and has been used 
by the mandiri officers to raise the banner of nationalism. 
'We can deal with our own affairs and don't need foreign 
intervention' blared headlines while the BIN chief was 
portrayed as too friendly with the Americans. The hawks in 
Washington, notably under-secretary of defence Paul 
Wolfowitz, have strong reasons to seek to restore contacts 
with the TNI, which were cut back in 1999 after the events 
in East Timar. But the black-and-white Bush doctrine, 'you 
are either with us or against us' doesn't go down well in 
Indonesia where there are many shades of grey. 
In March, Robert Mueller, the FBI chief, visited 
Hendropriyono. BIN has been quite helpful to the 
Americans by handing over a Pakistani terror suspect. 
Wolfowitz is trying to undo the legislative restrictions that 
were imposed on arms supplies to Indonesia by proposing 
new schemes of co-operation between the two militaries for 
counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics programmes. Yet, 
the State Department and Congress continue to insist that 
the officers responsible for the devastation in East Timar 
should be punished before ties can be normalised. The aver-
age TNI officer is deeply hurt by this attitude which could 
threaten Hendropriyono's position if he gets too close to the 
Washington hawks. 
While this conflict persists, the intelligence agencies 
continue to malfunction. The lack of transparency for 
outsiders, a universal problem in dealing with intelligence 
agencies, plus lack of control by parliament, points to the 
problems the country's political elite still has to cope with. 
TNI reforms at a dead end 
Soon after the fall of Suharto, the TNI launched its own 
internal reform programme, called 'repositioning, redefin-
ing and refreshing' the role of TNI. While giving the 
impression that it had accepted the principle of civilian 
supremacy, things were quite different. Although the 
mandiri group has agreed to abandon the political arena by 
leaving parliament in 2008, they still play a dominant role 
in Indonesian politics. The expansion of the territorial 
command system shows that the military are not prepared to 
take a few steps back; still worse, they hope to use the 
system as an economic and political tool to influence local 
conditions. The refusal to be questioned by human rights 
investigators is another sign of the TNI's refusal to assist in 
efforts to deal with grave past abuses. 
The strong re-emergence of TNI on the political scene 
largely reflects the weakness of civil society and the deep 
economic crisis, strengthening the bargaining position of 
the military vis-a-vis the civilians. Still worse, civilian 
members of parliament now accept the dominant role of the 
military and fall over themselves to win their support. 
On key issues like fighting separatism, the military have 
closed ranks, but on most other issues, they remain deeply 
divided. The political wing is convinced that the old style of 
working closely with the political establishment produces 
the best results. But the present batch of commanding offi-
cers loathe politics and prefer to stick to military affairs. 
What this means is ignoring the civilian administration and 
continuing to implement their own doctrines and concepts. 
The chances of the military accepting the democratic 
principle of returning to barracks are still a long way off. 
* 
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Aceh: Visit to a war zone 
In February Liem Soei Liong, TAPOL co-editor! made .a br~efvisit toAceh. Ac~h has been a focus 
for TAPOL for many years. Serious human rights vwlatwns have been going for well over a 
decade and since 2001 troops have flooded into Aceh, inflicting heavy casualtie! on the popula-
tion. The daily death toll has reached twenty, mostly civilians, and there are no signs that Jakarta 
is about to reverse its policies. 
From the moment of arriving at the airport of Banda 
Aceh, it is clear that it is a war zone. Heavily-armed police 
are everywhere and on the short journey to the city we 
passed several road blocks, both military and police. The 
Acehnese have learned to live with this but for an outsider 
like me, it certainly looks abnormal. According to reports, 
there are scores of road blocks on the main road from 
Medan to Banda Aceh. The streets in Banda Aceh also show 
all the signs of war. A wide variety of tanks and armoured 
personal carriers are part of the regular traffic. Street 
patrolling by military and police is also common; more 
often than not, the soldiers wear army trousers, casual t-
shirts and baseball caps, with semi-automatic rifles 
dangling from their shoulders. A grim scene indeed. 
Security people are present in such big numbers that it is 
impossible not to notice them when taking a stroll in the 
centre of the city 
A few days after my arrival in Jakarta before leaving for 
Aceh, heavy fighting broke out between TNI and GAM in 
the GAM stronghold of Pidie. In a battle that lasted for 
days, the GAM commander Abdullah Syafei, was killed 
together with his wife. Abdullah Syafei, or Teuku Lah as he 
was fondly known to the Acehnese, was very popular, a 
much-loved person whose passing was mourned by the 
majority of Acehnese who saw it as the passing of a martyr. 
A week later a new territorial command, Kodam 
Iskandar Muda, was installed by the TNI chief of staff 
General Endriartono Sutarto. These events forced me to 
postpone my departure for Aceh and I finally arrived in 
Banda Aceh the day aft,er the installation of the new 
command. 
The TNI has achieved a string of military successes over 
the past year and in many regions the armed wing of GAM 
has retreated to the mountains. But the political wing of 
GAM has spread its influence all over Aceh. According to a 
recent statement by the Indonesian police, at least one third 
of Acehnese villages are strongholds of GAM sympathisers. 
Most people I met in Aceh showed an amazing vitality 
with a strong dose of civil courage. Although I had previ-
ously met very few of the local activists, I quickly got along 
very well with everyone I met and had many intense discus-
sions during my short stay. 
After the huge mobilisation of support for a referendum 
in 1999 and 2000, the military stepped in with a vengeance 
and it became impossible to organise mass meetings or 
rallies. The democratic space provided by the civilian 
administration in Jakarta came to an end. The military 
authorities concluded that the danger of Indonesia's disinte-
gration was imminent. A series of military operations were 
launched in 2001 and 2002. The aim was clear: to drive 
AGAM, the military wing of GAM, out of the villages and 
towns while striking hard at civil society organisations. 
When I arrived in Banda Aceh many activists groups were 
still assessing the worsening conditions and strategising on 
how to cope with the new situation. 
Despite the huge presence of the military, the situation in 
Banda Aceh was less tense than I had expected. The string 
of military successes had probably led the TNI top to 
conclude that it would be advisable to lift the lid for a while. 
The recent tense atmosphere in Aceh has had a very delete-
rious effect on economic activity. Shortly before I arrived, 
dozens of women held a protest about difficulties market-
ing goods and complaining about the levies taken from 
traders on their way to market. Shops and streets stalls close 
quite early with the result that the 24-hour economy that 
exists in most Asian cities is less apparent in Banda Aceh. 
But I sometimes strolled in the streets after 1 Opm and life 
seemed to be gradually returning to normal. 
The stories I heard about the countryside are much 
worse. More often than not, people are told by the authori-
ties to stay at home after dark which amounts to an unoffi-
cial curfew. 
Background of the visit 
After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, there was an 
explosion of social activities in Aceh. A dazzling array of 
new NGOs/CSOs (civil society organisations) emerged and 
from 1998 till the end of 2000 civil society in Aceh flow-
ered and the political arena was full of vitality. Acehnese 
people organised themselves on a variety of issues. They 
held conferences and rallies, there were gatherings organ-
ised by victims of human rights abuses, rallies against mili-
tary brutality and against violence against women, and in 
1999, a mass rally calling for a referendum. 
This period brought to an end the gruesome decade 
(1989-1998) known as DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer), 
Military Operations Zone, when Aceh was under virtual 
military occupation and numerous human rights violations 
occurred . Within just two years, the Acehnese, despite a 
continuing reign of terror by the military, managed to give 
voice to their call for peace and justice. This brief 'Prague 
Spring' reached a climax in November 2000 when an esti-
mated one million people rallied for peace in Banda Aceh, 
organised by SIRA (Centre of Information for a 
Referendum in Aceh), with the active support of the many 
civil society organisations. One year earlier, a similar 
peaceful rally was held in Banda Aceh, attended by half a 
million people. These rallies marked a turning point for 
Aceh civil society. But such was the impact that the security 
forces were bent on doing whatever necessary to prevent 
such a thing from happening again. 
In May 2000 an unprecedented Peace Accord was 
signed in Davos, Switzerland facilitated by the Henri 
Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. But despite the 
accord, Aceh was plunged into an all-out war situation. The 
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year 2001 was a very bleak year when dozens of civilians, 
most villagers, were killed, captured or 'disappeared' every 
week, when Acehnese activists were harassed put on trial 
' ' or had to flee abroad; when NGOs/CSOs had barely any 
room to manoeuvre. As my hosts told me, it became urgent 
to make a re-appraisal of the situation in Aceh and in partic-
ular the strength and weaknesses of civil society. 
Jakarta's attitude towards Aceh 
As explained elsewhere in this issue, the Megawati 
government in Jakarta has not shown the political will to 
assert its supremacy over the military, and has accommo-
dated the military, allowing them to do what they like. This 
applies with a vengeance in Aceh. The Jakarta government 
has failed to provide the people of Aceh with a sense that 
justice is being done. On the contrary, the so-called compre-
hensive measures taken by Jakarta under the latest version 
of the 'presidential instruction' have only meant sending 
more troops. The thousands of horrific abuses that occurred 
during DOM and many more since DOM was lifted, have 
not been punished, leaving the Acehnese with a sense of 
deep betrayal. 
According to official figures, between 20,000 and 
30,000 troops are now stationed in Aceh but several local 
sources I spoke to say that the actual number is nearer to 
60,000 troops. The number of daily killings continues to 
mount. In 2001 the average daily death toll was ten, with 
non-combatants accounting for the vast majority of victims. 
In the first months of 2002 it increased to an average of 
twenty deaths a day, with up to 1, 700 deaths by mid April. 
The military approach taken by Jakarta is a clear sign of 
weakness and, as shown in other parts of the world, will 
only lead to more violence. If the Jakarta government were 
confident that it had the support of the people of Aceh, a 
withdrawal of troops would be the logical step. The Wahid 
government tried unsuccessfully to find a peaceful solution 
to the Aceh conflict while the Megawati government has 
Military on patrol in Aceh 
basically given free rein to the military to conduct military 
operations on a massive scale. Successive Jakarta govern-
ments have failed to understand the need for a policy that 
would resolve the conflict. The Indonesian authorities have 
ACEH 
ignored the political aspirations of the Acehnese, in partic-
ular their yearning for justice. The most basic questions 
have not been addressed. None of the massacres has been 
properly investigated and not one of the perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations has been brought to justice. 
Instead, the Jakarta government decided to grant Aceh 
special autonomy status known as NAD (Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam). The Acehnese had virtually no say in drafting 
the special autonomy law and have overwhelmingly 
rejected it. 
Two other schemes were foisted on the Acehnese: the 
introduction of syariah law and the re-establishment of the 
Aceh military command. A special Aceh desk was set up in 
Jakarta which has decided to use religion (Islamic concepts) 
as the solution for Aceh. This desk is under the direct 
control of General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the co-
ordinating minister for political and security affairs. 
Syariah law is expected to help solve the conflict in 
Aceh but many Acehnese disagree. Acehnese are already 
very devout in their religious beliefs and moreover, the 
conflict in Aceh is not about religion, but about sovereignty 
and justice. Still worse, the police have now taken it upon 
themselves to become a religious police, imposing penalties 
on women for not wearing the jilbab or keeping themselves 
'suitable attired' . There is even talk about people being 
punished for not praying five times a day. 
On 10 February 2002 a new Presidential Instruction was 
signed by President Megawati (Inpres No.1/2002) the stated 
purpose of which, like the two previous presidential instruc-
tions, is to find a 'comprehensive solution' to the conflict in 
Aceh. Megawati's presidential instruction continues in the 
footsteps of Inpres 4 and 7/2001 which both gave a free 
hand to the military and the intelligence to conduct military 
and counter-insurgency operations. It is evident that the 
Megawati government is bereft of new ideas on how to 
solve the political problems of Aceh. One of the crucial 
questions raised by this lack of vision is that, with the 
Indonesian economy in a state of virtual bankruptcy, how 
does the government think it can finance the running costs 
of what is likely to be a long-drawn-out war in Aceh? 
Strategy of TNI 
The re-establishment of the military command Kodam 
Iskandar Muda (which had been dissolved in 1985) is a 
victory for the military over the civilian government and 
Parliament. The lifting of DOM in 1998 and the growing 
strength of GAM seems to have persuaded TNI headquar-
ters that the carrot-and-stick approach hasn't worked and the 
security approach - sending more troops - is the only option. 
In the last three years, seven military operations have 
been launched: Operasi Wibawa '99, Operasi Sadar 
Rencong I, II and III, Operasi Cinta Meunasah I, II and III. 
In military terms, the TNI has been quite successful and, 
although it is difficult to make a proper assessment, it is true 
that GAM guerrilla units have been driven back from 
several areas in the last two years. 
The 23-year experience of military occupation of East 
!imor and its ~ver-mutating military strategies is now being 
implemented m Aceh; the similarity is quite striking. The 
military operational command called Kolakops, established 
in April 2001, even bears the same name as the military 
operational command in East Timor in the late eighties and 
is also directly commanded from the army HQ in Jakarta as 
was the case in East Timor. ' 
The military power of AGAM is still considerable, and 
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AGAM recruits enjoy better training and often have better 
equipment than their TNI adversaries, not to speak of their 
dedication to the struggle. In most parts of Indonesia, the 
police are responsible for law and order but in a war zone 
like Aceh, things are very different and the mi litary are 
responsible for law and order. 
Brig. General Djali Yusuf who was and still is comman-
der of Kolakops, has been appointed commander of Aceh 
military command, while the chief of staff is Colonel 
Syarifuddin Tippe, formerly commander of the Teuku Umar 
sub-district military command. While Brig. General Djali 
Yusuf represents the traditional combat officer, focusing on 
standard military operations, Colonel Syarifuddin Tippe is 
an officer with well-honed social skills who makes a habit 
of mixing with the general public and prides himself on 
getting involved in more intellectual pursuits. He recently 
wrote a book called El Hur, where he uses examples from 
the conflict in the Middle East to suggest ways of achieving 
reconciliation in Aceh. One of his briefs will be using reli-
Installation of Brig General Djali Yusuf as commander of 
Iskandar Muda 
gion to woo the population. Another of his briefs will likely 
be to intensify the use of militia gangs, a sure way to try and 
stir up division among the Acehnese. 
The Djali Yusuf gained high marks with the Jakarta 
authorities when his troops (mainly Kostrad elite troops) 
succeeded in killing the GAM commander Abdullah Syafei 
in January 2002. This is the approach that typifies the style 
of the post-Suharto professional officer. The Syarifuddin 
Tippe approach will pursue 'reconciliation' efforts or as 
described in Inpres No.1 /2002 'to deal with social discon-
tent' (original in English). 
While old style political generals like Wiranto and 
Hendropriyono directly involve themselves in daily politics 
[see separate article], the new style officers 'just follow 
orders' . This attitude is taken as meaning, 'we are the 
guardians of the nation and we know best how to deal with 
rebels'. And the order from Kostrad commander Lt. General 
Ryamizard Ryacudu is very clear: 'No mercy for the sepa-
ratists'. 
Aceh and civil society in Indonesia 
Most Indonesian NGOs adopt an attitude towards Aceh 
that can only be described as irrational or emotional. While 
understanding that there is widespread injustice in Aceh, 
they believe that pressing for accountability and bringing 
the perpetrators of abuses to court is all that needs to be 
done. The idea that the Aceh tragedy involves a political 
dimension, is simply not understood by most Indonesian~. 
In the past few years the Indonesian political commu?Ity 
has become used to the idea that one day West Papua might 
become an independent state but the idea of an Acehnese 
independent state is too painful to contemplate. 
Emotionally there is a boundary in the mindset o.f m.any 
Indonesians. An independent West Papua would stlil keep 
Indonesia intact, they seem to think, but were Ac~h to leave 
the fold, this would be the ultimate blow, leadmg to the 
disintegration of the Indonesian nation-state. . . 
Many seminars are held in Jakarta openly d1scussmg ~he 
issue of independence for West Papua and most Indonesian 
intellectuals tend to agree with the idea. But if Acehnese or 
Indonesians publicly speak out in favour of independence 
for Aceh, they are seen as traitors. The problem lies in the 
deeply ingrained idea of NKRI, the unitary state of 
Indonesia, among many Indonesians. Ever since the birth of 
the Republic up to today, there have been attempts in Aceh 
to break away from Jakarta. These secessionist movements 
had limited political agendas; they were either led by right-
wing military groups or local groups who wanted Indonesia 
to become an Islamic state. Many Indonesians consider the 
idea of Aceh breaking away as being very negative. It will 
take time before Indonesians can learn to sympathise or at 
least behave less emotionally towards the idea of Acehnese 
independence. 
The peace process 
After a stalemate lasting seven months, the HDC 
conducted a new round of talks between the Jakarta govern-
ment and GAM in Geneva. The meeting in the first week-
end of February created new openings, notably the willing-
ness on GAM's part to discuss the issue ofNAD, the special 
autonomy law for Aceh. The GAM spokesperson at the 
Geneva talks, Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, said afterwards that 
GAM regarded the results as satisfactory, welcoming the 
fact it has been agreed to resolve the conflict by democratic 
means. 'This is a good result for the people of Aceh. We are 
committed to implementing the agreement. We hope that 
the Indonesian side are similarly committed.' (Kontras 
No.176, 6-12 February 2002) 
It was agreed that four points would be discussed in 
greater detail at a later stage (30 to 45 days after the 
February meeting): 
(1) Cessation of all acts of violence. (2) A transparent, 
all-inclusive dialogue to be held in 2002 or 2003. (3) The 
election of a democratic government in Aceh through free 
and fair elections in May 2004, and ( 4) Both sides conduct-
ing a review of the above points. 
Things may look fine in Geneva, but the political 
atmosphere in Jakarta is quite different. The professional 
TNI officers who are dedicated to a military solution are 
implacably opposed to the talks; they see it as humiliating 
to negotiate with rebels who want independence. However, 
the political generals in the cabinet, notably retired General 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, coordinating minister for 
political and security affairs, realise on one hand that a mili-
tary approach will not result in a solution but at the same 
time want to avoid internationalising the issue. He is on 
record as saying that a 'Malino type' solution (used for the 
conflicts in Poso and Maluku) should be sought for Aceh. 
The Malino accords were concluded earlier this year 
between Muslim and Christian groups which have been 
fighting each other for years. Clearly such an approach has 
no relevance in Aceh. 
continued on p 9 
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Aceh: from rights abuses to Syari'a law 
As in previous years, violence in Aceh has continued in the midst of uncertainty about the peace 
process between GAM and the government. More civilians were reported killed by the TN/ and 
Brimob in their efforts to locate GAM units and establish better 'security' through intensive and 
indiscriminate military operations. 
The victims of these operations are not only suspected 
GAM members but also women, children and the elderly. 
Four women and three children have been killed since 
January this year in addition to an estimated four hundred 
civilians. Many were found dead after being arrested by the 
TNI for questioning. Their bodies were dumped in villages 
or by the roadside as a warning to others not to support 
GAM, the Free Aceh Movement. Such tactics have been 
practised by TNI, the Indonesian armed forces, since mili-
tary operations began in Aceh back in 1989. 
TNI and Brimob (special police force) units have 
destroyed and burned houses in villages suspected of being 
used as GAM bases, though they have produced no 
evidence of GAM fighters hiding there. They have occupied 
private businesses such as a rice milling factory in North 
Aceh for use as their operational base. The mill is being 
used as a 'concentration camp', where civilians are tortured 
to extract information about GAM units. This is a new mili-
tary strategy, not unlike the one they practised when Pos 
Sattis were set up in different parts of Aceh during the DOM 
(military operations zone) period in the 1990s, when thou-
sands of people were detained, tortured, and killed. 
Syarifuddin Tippe, chief of staff of the recently estab-
lished military command, Kodam Iskandar Muda, has told 
his Rajawali soldiers (a unit that is known to have commit-
ted grave human rights abuses in Aceh), that 'dialogue is 
unrelated to military operations in Aceh, so don't hesitate to 
go ahead with your actions'. (Serambi Indonesia, 1 April). 
His statement has been supported by the deployment of 
another 1,3 5 8 Kostrad, (Strategic Reserve Command) 
troops in Aceh on 26 April. The TNI believes that it has the 
right to conduct these operations in Aceh beyond the control 
of President Megawati. So we now have a repeat of prac-
tices under the Suharto-style government, where power is in 
the hands of the military. 
The many grievances of the people of Aceh at the hands 
of TNI and Brimob since 1989 have gone unheeded by the 
Jakarta government. For the Acehnese, it is not a question 
of having better economic benefits through the special 
autonomy law imposed from Jakarta or introducing the 
unwanted Syari'ah law. It is a question of achieving justice 
for victims of the conflict and punishing those guilty of 
crimes against humanity. 
Syari'a law, an unnecessary intrusion 
Jakarta's response to Acehnese demands for justice and 
the withdrawal of the military has been to implement 
Syari'ah law, which is an unnecessary measure for Acehnese 
who are already devout and have practised Islam for gener-
ations without any problems. There is no religious conflict 
between Acehnese and Jakarta; the dispute is about seeking 
justice and political rights. 
Acehnese int~Iectuals, NGO activists and women's 
groups see the implementation of Syari'ah law in Aceh as an 
attempt by Jakarta to distract attention from political and 
human rights issues by creating an image of Acehnese as-
fundamentalist, radical Muslims, and persuading the 
outside world not to support them as they try to cope with 
state brutality. Also the government hopes to convey a 
message to Indonesians elsewhere that Jakarta has paid seri-
ous attention to the sufferings of the Acehnese by fulfilling 
their wishes . 
Implementation of the law began on 15 March. To mark 
the occasion, the governor held a rally of three thousand 
high school students, paying them each Rp. 7 ,500 (US$ 
0,90) to take part (Jakarta Post, 16 March). Female students 
were required to wear dresses down to their ankles and 
jilbab (head cover) and male students had to wear trousers 
and kopiah to look like Muslims. Government and private 
offices and shops are required to write their names in Arabic 
script. In East Aceh, the police set up checkpoints where 
women not wearing ajilbab are stopped, given one free and 
told to put it on. No one has explained what the role of 
police is in this matter but the authorities are trying to win 
the hearts and minds of the Acehnese. However, Acehnese 
see this as a camouflage; the authorities don't seem to 
realise that they are discriminating against women and 
abusing their rights, dignity and the freedom to practice 
their beliefs in the way they see fit. 
Women in Aceh see Syari'ah law as a means of restrict-
ing their freedom of movement. Acehnese women know 
how to behave as good Muslims, without Jakarta telling 
them what to do. In Aceh, parents are responsible for the 
religious education of their children. Some women say they 
are afraid that, if traditionally interpreted, Syari'ah law will 
tie them to the kitchen and prevent them from engaging in 
activities now dominated by men. The law could also trig-
ger new conflict in Aceh, as there are groups with tradi-
tional beliefs and others with modem beliefs of Islam. 
Many intellectuals in Aceh gained degrees in Islamic stud-
ies at western universities, while others stick to a traditional 
interpretation oflslam. This could be a time bomb for Aceh, 
making it possible for Jakarta to claim that the conflict in 
Aceh is religious, not political. 
People in Aceh are in the dark about how this new law 
will be implemented. There is confusion among intellectu-
als and ulamas while the general public are on the whole 
apathetic and very unresponsive. * 
continued from p 8 
In mid-April, in advance of the forthcoming HDC 
encounter at the end of April, General Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono went to Europe on a mission connected with 
the Aceh conflict. There were reports that he was planning 
to hold 'informal' talks with a GAM delegation. He did 
indeed go to Sweden which is where the GAM leadership 
is based but to meet members of the Swedish government, 
not anyone from GAM. His mission, by all accounts, was 
to seek the help of the Swedish authorities to convince the 
GAM people to accept special autonomy. * 
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Peasant activists under fire 
Brutal actions against peasant actions in many parts of the Indonesian countryside to take back 
their land seized during the Suharto era, point to a pattern of collusion between companies protect-
ing land against the rightful owners, local government, the courts and the security forces. 
In the previous Bulletin, we outlined the link between 
human rights abuses and land rights issues and the impor-
tance of implementing genuine agrarian reform in order to 
respect and uphold the rights the Indonesian people, the 
majority of whom still live in rural areas. The article indi-
cated that the use of violence against peasant farmers and 
indigenous peoples asserting their right to reclaim their land 
since reformasi has not decreased. Patterns of the pre-
meditated and systematic use of repression, involving the 
collusion of local government, security forces, business 
interests and the courts oflaw are increasingly apparent and 
this article, the second in the series, aims to focus on this 
aspect of the reality of the struggle for land and human 
rights violations in Indonesia. 
Patterns of repression 
Violence and Impunity: usually perpetrated with the aid 
of the security forces, is still the most common response to 
the peaceful struggle for land. One pattern increasingly 
evident is the use ofBrimob, the special combat force of the 
police, by both private and state companies to respond to 
organised resistance. Poltak, Director of the Land Section 
of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, YLBHI, stated that 
one consequence of the fall of Suharto and the separation 
between the military and the police, was the increasingly 
'freelance' nature of Brimob's operations, and agreed that 
they were particularly evident in the area of land disputes. 
Two such examples were given in the previous Bulletin, 
namely the Sosa case of North Sumatra, and the Cibaliung 
case of Banten, where Brimob are known to be in the pay of 
local companies. 
The Ladongi case 
On 11 March this year in the Ladongi case, once again 
the collusion between companies, local government and the 
security forces was all too eloquently demonstrated as three 
squads comprised of Brimob and local police officers fired 
into a crowd of around 400 farmers and indigenous peoples 
occupying a cocoa plantation in Kolaka sub-district, 
Southeast Sulawesi. Permission to camp on the disputed 
land had been negotiated between the local leaders and the 
police on 24 February 2002. This particularly cynical shoot-
ing incident, injuring at least 30 people, took place as a pre-
arranged meeting was taking place at the district assembly 
office in Kolaka between representatives of the people, the 
company (the privately owned PT Hasfarm, in which Tutut, 
Suharto's oldest daughter, is a shareholder) and local 
government. 
Targeting of Human Rights Defenders/Leaders and 
intimidation: It is clear that in all cases where there is 
organised resistance to land rights violations, it is the lead-
ers who are targeted in an attempt to break up the move-
ment. In the Ladongi incident lskandar Amin, coordinator 
of the Southeast Sulawesi Farmers Forum and the Southeast 
Sulawesi Indigenous Peoples Alliance, was one of those 
injured as Brimob and the local police fired into the crowd. 
I skandar was 
shot in the 
right thigh, 






him as he fell 
onto the 
ground. The 
p o I i c e 
punched and 
kicked him in 
the chest and 
head, taking 
him to one of 
their vehicles. 
Once in the 
vehicle, 
Iskandar was 
shot at point 
blank range 
two more 
times, once in 
Banten peasant activists behind bars the right calf 
and once in his 
left thigh. He was then taken to Kolaka hospital. Altogether 
nine farmers were arrested and are still in detention, includ-
ing Iskandar Amin. 
Courts used to criminalise resistance 
The courts of law are used in many ways. The collusion 
of the courts in land rights cases by finding in favour of the 
companies responsible for land rights violations is nothing 
new. A number of farmers and indigenous peoples have 
tried to take their cases to court and aside from the inherent 
financial limitations and the risks involved, in by far the 
largest number of cases the court finds in favour of the 
company. 
An exception to that rule is evidence in a recent case in 
Yogyakarta, where a small plot of land (around 2 ha) was 
taken from local people by the military, who planted sugar 
cane. The local people reoccupied the land and the military 
took the case to court but in a deviation from the norm, the 
court found in favour of the farmers. However, the military, 
angry at this decision, are now counter-suing the farmers 
and are taking them to court, accusing them of 'undermin-
ing the authority of the military' 
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and machetes with them into the fields, their tools of trade. 
If the farmers resort to violence, the case against them is 
clear and they are charged, and even when they do not, the 
very fact that they are carrying 'offensive weapons' is used 
to charge them Thus, the organisation of local thugs into 
what may be described as 'mini-militia' is also a feature of 
the attack on organised resistance and the peaceful assertion 
of land rights. 
Land rights are human rights 
The examples above are only a few of many indicating 
the pre-meditated and systematic nature of the use of 
repression against the peaceful struggle for land in individ-





patterns of a 
national trend in 
the handling of 
land rights cases 
by the state are 
increasingly 
' evident. Violence 
Divide et impera 
and provocation 
Despite continued intimidation, the people of Cibaliung have returned to their 
land and can be seen here rebuilding the village hall - one of 67 buildings 
burnt to the ground with the assistance of Brimob and local police officers. 
and impunity, the 
corruption of the 
courts and lack of 




sent a trend not 
only in Indonesia, 
but globally, as 
trade liberalisa-
tion and the 
burden of debt on 
developing coun-One tactic adopted by 
companies involved in land disputes with local people is to 
attempt to create hostility between villagers at local level. 
This is done in a number of ways, and often with the collu-
sion of members of the security forces and local govern-
ment. For example, in the Cibaliung case, the company set 
up an 'NGO' by the name of the Erlina Bakti Foundation 
which attempted to cause rifts between villagers in the area 
who were members of the SPB and those who were not. 
Erlina Bakti Foundation used local preman, or thugs to 
intimidate local villagers. In a case in Wonosari, local 
elements in the pay of the company attempted to encourage 
local villagers to take a local peasant farmers organisation 
to court because they were using the name 'Wonosari.' It 
was suggested to the villagers that the peasant farmers use 
of the name Wonosari was illegitimate and was giving the 
location a bad name. A means which according to Poltak is 
sometimes still used in Java in particular to cause suspicion 
and break up unity amongst local people is to accuse organ-
ised peasant resistance of being communist. 
Peasant farmers and indigenous peoples, angry at the 
theft of their land - which means much more to them than 
as a source of income - are often all too easily provoked into 
acts of violence by company foremen, local thugs and 
members of the security forces. Farmers often carry knives 
tries demand that more and more land is turned over to cash 
crops. It is imperative that, as these patterns of human 
rights violations linked to land rights disputes become 
increasingly evident, human rights organisations take up the 
issue ofland rights and access to natural resources as a seri-
ous focus for their campaign work. * 
continued from p 27. 
Please contact the address and website below for 
access to the petition and supporting documents. 
Organisations and others are encouraged to support the 
campaign by contacting West Papua Action, Ireland at 
wpaction@ol.ie 
http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/unreview * 
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Theys murder inquiry blocked by cover-up 
The investigation into the murder of the chairperson of the Papuan Presidium Council has led to 
the arrest of three Kopassus soldiers who are likely to be charged with murder ... and anger that 
the motives for the killing are not being investigated. Meanwhile, fears are growing in West Pap~~ 
about the arrival of thousands of Laskar Jihad militias in many parts of the territory. Also, the mili-
tary are demanding a role in guarding British Petroleum's huge natural gas plant under construc-
tion in Bintuni Bay. 
The special commission (KPN) set up in March by 
President Megawati to investigate the abduction and assas-
sination ofTheys Hiyo Eluay, the chairperson of the Papuan 
Presidium Council (PDP), delivered its report on 1 May, 
the contents of which have not been made public. But the 
main development surrounding the assassination is the 
announcement that three Kopassus (the elite special force) 
soldiers, and possibly another three suspects, have been 
arrested and are likely to go on trial for murder. They 
include middle-ranking officers and NCOs, and are to be 
charged under Article 338 of the Criminal Code 'for unlaw-
fully taking a life', for which the maximum penalty is fifteen 
years. This will be coupled with the charge of 'insubordina-
tion', protecting their superior officers against being incrim-
inating in the crime. Because all the suspects are military 
men, they will face a court-martial, not a trial in a civil 
court. 
Motive will not be investigated 
Theys Eluay was 
abducted on I 0 November 
last year as he was returning 
home from a reception at the 
Kopassus Tribuana head-
quarters in Jayapura and his 
body was found on 11 
November. An autopsy found 
that he had been strangled. 
His driver, Aristoteles 
Masuko, was ejected from 
the vehicle as soon as it was 
ambushed; he then returned 
to the Kopassus base, appar-
ently with the intention of 
reporting the assault to the 
commander who had just 
hosted Theys. However, 
nothing has been heard of 
him since entering the base, 
and he is presumed dead. His 
disappearance has complicated the investigations because 
he would have been the key witness. Nothing has been said 
about whether his disappearance, clearly at the hands of 
Kopassus, will be investigated as a crime, as well as the 
killing of Theys Eluay. 
Although local human rights organisations and leaders 
of the PDP have insisted that this was an assassination with 
clear political motives, everything suggests that the military 
authorities will deal with the killing as a straightforward 
murder case. The way the case is being handled suggests 
12 
that everything is being done to prevent a thorough investi-
gation to discover who masterminded the crime and what 
the true motive was. Military commanders in Jayapura and 
Jakarta have vigorously denied that there was any order to 
murder the Papuan independence leader and insist that the 
killing was committed by 'rogue elements' in Kopassus. 
Some commentators have pointed the finger at the coun-
try's leading intelligence agency, BIN headed by Lt.General 
Hendropriyono, for having a hand in the killing. 
To distract attention from the political dimensions of the 
assassination, reports began to circulate in the press that 
Theys was the victim of a business row over the proceeds of 
a timber project but such claims were slapped down by PDP 
General Secretary, Thaha Al Hamid. 'People should stop 
playing around; the murder has nothing whatever to do with 
business interests', he told Suara Pembaruan [4 April]. 
KPN results condemned 
The findings of the KPN were greeted with howls of 
protest. West 
Papuans held a rally 
in Jayapura to reject 
the findings and also 
to mark the 3 9th 
anniversary of the 
day (1 May) when 
Indonesia took over 
control of West 
Papua from 






a · former senior 
police officer and 
currently member of 
the National Human 
Theys Eluay's funeral Rights Commission, 
admitted in an inter-
view that it was 'unlikely' that the members of Kopassus 
would have acted without having been ordered, but said that 
the KPN could not go farther than to establish that a crime 
had taken place and to identify those who committed the 
crime. 'It had no powers to conduct an investigation into the 
motive behind the killing.' 
John Rumbiak of the Jayapura-based human rights 
organisation ELSHAM responded angrily, saying that there 
was clear evidence that Theys was killed as part of a secret 
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leadership of the independence movement, in the eyes of 
Jakarta (was) threatening the unity of Indonesia.' 
Asmara Nababan, general secretary of the National 
Human Rights Commission also expressed deep dissatis-
faction with the KPN findings . He condemned the KPN's 
recommendation that follow-up investigations into the 
motive should be left to the military police, because 'the 
military police is not an independent institution'. [ABC's 
Asia/Pacific Programme, 1 May.] 
Laskar Jihad presence a serious threat 
In the past few months, there has been growing alarm in 
West Papua about the arrival of members of the militant 
Muslim organisation, Laskar Jihad. According to ELSHAM 
and other sources, at least three thousand members are now 
spread in many parts of West Papua. 
Laskar Jihad has caused immeasurable damage in 
Maluku and in Poso, Central Sulawesi, by fomenting 
conflict between the Muslim and Christian communities, 
causing thousands of deaths and forcing hundreds of thou-
sands of people to flee their home in search of sanctuary. 
The aim of the organisation, under its inflammatory 
commander, Jafar Umar Thalib, is clearly to trigger hori-
zontal conflict between religious communities. But a new 
strategy has now been adopted by the organisation, that of 
posing as protectors of the unitary state of Indonesia 
(NKRl) against 'separatists', a term which they are begin-
ning to use synonymously with Christians. This was the 
thrust of a speech given by Jafar Umar Thalib in a mosque 
in Ambon in late April (see separate article). 
They clearly see West Papua as fertile soil for their divi-
sive activities, a region where the Christian religion has a 
wide following and where there is widespread support for 
independence from the Republic of Indonesia. There are 
Muslims among the indigenous population of West Papua, 
most of whom live in the western regions of Sorong and 
Fak-Fak, but the number of Muslims in West Papua has 
risen sharply with the arrival over the past three decades of 
tens of thousands of transmigrant families from Java, the 
vast majority of whom are Muslims. 
Laskar Jihad leaders, who always claim that their aim is 
to engage in social activities, now admit that their Forum 
Komunikasi Ah/us Sunaah Wal Jamaah has set up branches 
in seven regions in West Papua, including Sorong, Fak-
Fak, Manokwari, Nabire, Timika and Jayapura. Their 
members are easily distinguishable by the Jong white robes 
they wear, with a sword dangling from the waist. 
Rapid expansion in Sorong 
According to a report received in Jayapura from local 
ELSHAM activists in Sorong, there has been a marked 
increase in the numbers arriving since the peace accords 
were concluded in February this year between Muslims and 
Christians in Poso and Maluku. No fewer than seventy 
members are arriving in Sorong every week by ship from 
Maluku and North Maluku. Local members distribute their 
publication, Buletin Laskar Jihad. The .15 January issue 
carried a report accusing Christians of being supporters of 
separatism in Ambon, North Maluku, Poso and East Nusa 
Tenggara. 
In March, twenty church leaders, eight local tribal lead-
ers and local youth leaders met to discuss the problem and 
issued a joint statement on 18 March, rejecting the arrival of 
large numbers of Laskar Jihad in Sorong. They said they 
were fearful of the impact of leaflets, newsletters, videos 
showing scenes of rioting and conflict in Maluku being 
distributed in Sorong. They expressed support for a decla-
ration issued in February by a conference of tribal leaders 
from all parts of West Papua, in support of living in close 
co-operation with communities from outside, to create a 
West Papua free from violence, oppression and greed and 
expressing respect for other communities living in West 
Papua, irrespective of ethnicity or religion. 
Army-sponsored 'red-and-white' militias 
In the Central ; Highlands town of Wamena, there have 
for several months been reports of the recruitment and train-
ing of government-sponsored· 'Merah-Putih' militia groups 
(named after the red-and-white colours of the Indonesian 
flag). This is reminiscent of the militia groups set up in East 
Timor in the months before the August 1999 ballot, to 
destroy the independence movement there . 
Now, the human rights organisation, ELSHAM has 
obtained a leaked copy of a three-page document, dated 8 
April, which lists the names of eighty farmers described as 
'candidates' of Satgas Merah Putih. The document is signed 
by the commander of the local military command in 
Wamena. John Rumbiak told the press that he had been 
aware of'red-and-white' militias getting training in Wamena 
since August last year, but this letter was the first documen-
tary evidence that proves the relationship between the mili-
tias and the Indonesian army. [Times Online, UK, 27 April 
2002] 
Thaha Al Hamid, secretary-general of the PDP, himself 
a Muslim, has added his voice to those rejecting the pres-
ence of Laskar Jihad in West Papua. 'There is no reason for 
them to be here. What we worry about most is that their 
presence may cause conflict between Papuan people - reli-
gious conflict, ethnic conflict, racial conflict,' he told CNN. 
'They never once came to talk to me. I am Muslim. Even the 
local branch of the Indonesian Council of Ulemmas 
(Muslim leaders) reject them,' said Tho ha. 'We may be 
fighting for independence from an unjust government but 
we never once have any conflict amongst the people. In 
Papua, not one mosque has ever been burnt, not one grass 
has ever been pulled from the front of a mosque,' Thaha 
added. [CNN, 19 April] 
Who will guard BP's gas project? 
A huge natural gas project run by British Petroleum, 
which is known as the Tangguh project, is currently under 
construction in and around Bintuni Bay and is expected to 
start production in 2006. The company has gone out of its 
way to convey a friendly face, insisting that they will 
consult with and listen to local people in dealing with the 
impact of its operations on local communities who will be 
required to move their homes. 
In particular, they have announced their intention to 
have a 'military-free' complex, hoping to make arrange-
ments with local communities and the police about guard-
ing the project. They are trying hard to give the company a 
fa~eli_ft, to counter ~he bitter. disp~tes they are grappling 
with m other countnes, especially m Columbia. They also 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 166/167, April/May 2002 13 
WEST.PAPUA . 
. . 
want to avoid the conflicts triggered by the presence of a 
large contingent of army troops guarding the Freeport/Rio 
Tinto gold and copper mine in Timika, West Papua, and the 
many human rights violations around the periphery of the 
Exxon/Mobile natural gas project in North Aceh also under 
heavy army 'protection', where security concerns forced the 
company to halt production for several months last year. 
However, whatever the intentions of the company, they 
certainly knew before deciding to invest in West Papua that 
the military are present in large numbers and are notorious 
not only for their utter disregard for the rights and interests 
of local people but also for finding ways to bolster their 
earnings by giving 'protection' to local companies, particu-
larly to 'vital projects' which would definitely include BP's 
natural gas project. 
It should have come as no surprise therefore when the 
regional military commander, Major-General Mahidin 
Simbolon, said it was the duty of the military to protect the 
site. In March, the commander, along with a dozen officers 
accompanied by their wives, made an unannounced visit to 
the site. According to company officials, the officers 
strolled round the site, brandishing automatic weapons, 
which 'made us feel uncomfortable', said one official. 
During a meeting at the site, the general said the military 
has an obligation under the Indonesian Constitution to 
protect 'national assets' such as the BP plant. He said that 
only a ruling by President Megawati could deter the armed 
forces from taking charge of security. [Wall Street Journal, 
Special NI issue on West Papua 
West Papua is the central focus of the New 
Internationalist's April 2002 issue. The seven articles and 
fact sheets provide an excellent overview of the present situ-
ation in West Papua. 
The editor, Chris Richards, arrived in West Papua just in 
time to attend the funeral of Theys Hiyo Eluay, chairperson 
of the Papuan Presidium Council whose abduction and assas-
sination on 10-11 November last year shocked and angered 
the people of West Papua. The twenty thousand people who 
attended the funeral came from all parts of the huge territory. 
She writes: 'Judging from the 
unity among the funeral 
crowd, Indonesia has already 
lost West Papua.' 
She explains how she had 
to correct her understanding 
of the OPM which she had 
thought of as a 'small and 
secret band of freedom fight-
ers based deep in the high-
lands'. Instead, she found that 
every West Papuan she met 
during her travels claimed ' 
allegiance to the OPM. As 
one man told her: '... being 
OPM is in the heart, it is 
14 
19 April] 
Local NGOs not satisfied 
Meanwhile local NGOs have expressed disappointment 
' • f • 
with a planned public hearing about the pro}ect s environ-
mental impact assessment (AMDAL), ~aymg that l~cal 
NGOs and communities have not been given enough tm:ie 
to study the relevant documents, in particular the terms of 
reference of the assessment, which have not been made 
available to local communities. The Manokwari NGO 
Alliance for Tangguh Advocacy complained that only nine 
villages had received the terms of reference, n.amely the 
villages that will be 'directly' impacted by the project. There 
were no grounds for the more than forty villages that will be 
'indirectly' impacted to be excluded. The Alliance said it did 
not understand how local communities could make an 
assessment of the project if they have not seen the relevant 
documents in advance. 
The Alliance called for the project to be reconsidered, 
saying that the ecosystem in the Bintuni Bay is unique and 
has been supporting the life of the communities living 
round the Bay for centuries. 'Short-term economic growth 
interests pushing this project threaten to destroy the ability 
of the Bintuni Bay to provide future natural support systems 
to the community and thus threaten to destroy the very 
survival of the Bintuni Bay community,' the Alliance said in 
a press release issued on 12 April. * 
about being West Papuan and wanting independence.' 
An article about British Petroleum's natural gas 
project in Bintuni Bay describes the company's ties with 
the Papuan Presidium Council, helping to pay the PDP's 
running costs and even , Richards was told, being 
prepared to fund international investigators to lift the lid 
on the activities of the armed forces in the area. The 
company wants to ensure community support by making 
sure the benefits from the company flow back to the 
community, after the resources have been extracted, NI 
was told. 
'Playing up the primitive' by anthropologist and histo-
. rian Eben Kirkskey, describes how the Indonesian 
· authorities have misused very lively Papuan traditions 
by selecting fragments for incorporation into the 
Indonesian identity within a racist system that devalues 
Papuans as primitives. He writes: 'Deep, sometimes 
mystical, convictions, drive Papuan cultural resistance to 
Indonesian rule'. 
Another article puts the spotlight on a highland organ-
isation, DEMMAK, the Penis Gourd People's Assembly, 
which is pushing for new government structures based on 
tribal traditions rather than political parties. But as the 
article points out, women don't have a vote in these 
assemblies and DEMMAK unashamedly excludes 
· women. Copies of the issue are available from TAPOL. 
' Please contact us on tapol@gn.apc.org for details. 
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Jakarta trials unlikely to provide justice for East Timor 
After much delay, the trials of seven men charged with crimes against humanity in East Timor 
finally began before an ad hoc human rights court in Jakarta on 14 March. There is little 
evidence, however, that the proceedings will satisfy East Timorese demands for justice. The UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson has once again recommended an interna-
tional tribunal for East Timor and that remains the only real option for meaningful justice. 
Those currently on trial in Jakarta include former gover-
nor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, former East Timor police 
chief, Brigadier General Timbul Silaen, four middle-rank-
ing Indonesian military officers and one police officer. 
The charges relate mainly to the attacks on Liquica 
Church on 6 April 1999, on Manuel Carrascalao's house in 
Dili on 17 April 1999, on Bishop Belo's house in Dili on 6 
September 1999 and on the Suai Church compound on 6 
September 1999. 
Each of the accused is charged under the principle of 
command responsibility for acts committed by his subordi-
nates. In each case, it is alleged that the accused failed to 
exercise proper control over his subordinates, and either 
had, or deliberately ignored, information that showed his 
subordinates were committing or had committed serious 
human rights violations. Furthermore, the accused did not 
take the necessary steps to prevent or stop those acts or to 
surrender the perpetrators to investigation, prosecution and 
punishment. 
The following commentary is not intended to imply 
anything about the guilt or otherwise of the accused, who 
are all innocent until proved guilty. 
Case 1: Abilio Soares 
In the first case, former governor Abilio Soares is 
charged under Articles 9(a) and 9(h) of Indonesia's Law on 
Human Rights Courts (Law 26/2000) with crimes against 
humanity for killings and acts of'persecution' committed by 
subordinates during the four incidents in April and 
September 1999. 
Persecution (in some unofficial translations of the Law 
the word used is 'terrorisation') is defined by Article 9(h) as 
'persecution of a particular group or association based on 
political views, race, nationality, ethnic origin, culture, reli-
gion, sex or any other basis, regarded universally as contra-
vening international law'. The offence has been copied 
largely from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, which further defines persecution as the 'intentional 
and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the group or collectivity'. 
However, since the Indonesian word for persecution is 
similar to the word for assault, it seems that this offence is 
being used primarily for alleged assaults. In practice, what 
seems to be happening is that Article 9(a) is being used in 
relation to victims who were killed and Article 9(h) is being 
used in relation to victims who were injured (i.e. assaulted), 
but survived. 
Soares is accused of having overall responsibility for 
virtually everything that happened in East Timor. The 
specific allegation against him is that he had civilian 
command responsibility for the failings of his subordinates, 
namely the two bupatis (district heads), Leonito Martins of 
Liquica and Herman Sedyono of Covalima (which covers 
Suai), Eurico Guterres as deputy PPI commander (the over-
arching organisation of pro-integration groups in East 
Timor), and groups of People's Volunteer Guards (Pam 
Swakarsa) popularly known as militias. 
The alleged lines of responsibility to Soares and the 
connection between the subordinates and the alleged crimes 
are not entirely clear from the indictment, but these matters 
may be clarified during the course of the proceedings. 
Case 2: Timbul Silaen 
In the second case, former police chief, Timbul Silaen 
is charged under Articles 9(a) and 9(h) of Law 26/2000 with 
crimes against humanity for killings and acts of persecution 
perpetrated by subordinates during the same incidents and 
also for persecution in relation to an attack on the 
UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Tmior) office in 
Li qui ca on 4 September 1999. 
The indictment alleges that Silaen failed to secure public 
safety and security in relation to the four incidents and was 
liable for the crimes committed by way of police command 
responsibility. 
The indictment further alleges that there was a wide-
spread and systematic attack against the civilian population 
committed by those under Silaen's power and control, 
including Aitarak, and BMP militias. 
Case 3: Suai. Church massacre 
In the third case, the five accused are charged under 
Article 9(a) with crimes against humanity for failing to 
prevent killings perpetrated during the attack on the Suai 
Church compound (it is not clear whether they are also 
charged under Article 9(h)). 
The five accused are: 
Lieutenant colonel Herman Sudyono, former bupati of 
Covalima district; 
Lieutenant colonel Liliek Koeshadianto, former comman-
der Suai District military command; 
Lieutenant, Colonel Gatot Subiyaktoro the former police 
chief of Suai; 
Captain Achmad Syamsudin, former chief-of-staff, Suai 
district military command; and 
Lieutenant Sugito, former commander, Suai military sector 
command. 
According to the indictment, the actual attack was 
carried out by Mahidi and Laksaur militias supported by 
lower-level members of the Indonesian armed forces. The 
prosecution claims that approximately 27 people were 
killed in the attack, including three priests. The figure is 
disputed by East Timorese sources who say the number is 
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closer to 200 [see JSMP/IPJET, 'Suai Church massacre trial 
starts in Jakarta', 21March2002]. 
The indictment alleges that the first three accused went 
to the church when shots were fi red. They did nothing to 
stop the shooting and did not take steps to identify and assist 
victims, calm the situation, save people or notify families of 
victims. An Indonesian soldier has testified that he was 
ordered by his commanding officer, the accused Sugito, to 
transport and bury around 25 bodies following the atrocity 
[AFP, 23 April 2002]. 
Remaining suspects 
No indictments have yet been issued against the remain-
ing 11 of the 18 persons named by the attorney general's 
Former govenor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, 
charged with crimes against humanity. 
office as suspects in the East Timar violence, including the 
former regional military commander, Major-General Adam 
Damiri and militia leader Eurico Guterres. 
The indictment in the case of the Suai Church massacre 
claims that charges will also be laid individually against 
militias involved in the attack, including some who are not 
on the list of 18 suspects ( eg. Vasco da Cruz, Martins 
Dongki Alfon, Serda I Gede Santika, Sertu I Wayan, Praka 
Alfredo Amaral). 
Show trials 
Although it is too early to make a proper analysis of the 
trials, it is fair to say that nothing has happened so far to 
counter the strong impression that they are little more than 
16 
show tri als des igned to avoid the embarrassment of 
Indonesian military officers being called to account before 
an international tribunal. It certainly does not appear to be 
a process aimed at establishing the truth of what happened 
in East Timar. 
In an editorial on 19 March, The Jakarta Post suggested 
that the trials 'may be seen largely as a response to outside 
pr,essure or an attempt to please the international commu-
nity, rather than a genuine attempt to find the truth, uphold 
justice and punish the guilty'. 
Serious flaws in the process remain and there is little 
sign that they will be addressed. The Indonesian govern-
ment seems insistent that it will not extend the jurisdiction 
of the court, which is limited to crimes committed only in 
April and in September 1999 in Dili, Liquica and Suai. 
There are indications that the authorities intend to 
proceed with just five cases in total [see Amnesty 
International press release 22 April 2002]. That would 
mean there will be no accountability for the thousands of 
crimes committed at other times and in other areas, includ-
ing those relating to the forcible deportation of around 
250,000 East Timorese to West Timor, the wave of violence 
and destruction which left up to 80 per cent. of the infra-
structure destroyed, and atrocities such as the massacre at 
the Maliana police station on 8 September 1999 and at 
Passabe, Oecussi on 10 September 1999 in which dozens 
were killed. Much of the evidence of the systematic nature 
of the violence will also remain suppressed. 
The Indonesian authorities may also be reluctant to pros-
ecute in the case of the murder of Dutch journalist Sander 
Thoenes in Dili on 21 September 1999 despite convincing 
evidence implicating Indonesian army battalion 745 
[Christian Science Monitor, 29 April 2002]. Their reluc-
tanc~ is most likely connected to the fact that the case 
expos~s the role of the army and senior officers in system-
atic abuse against civilians. Sander Thoenes was one of 
twelve civilians allegedly killed by Battalion 745 in three 
days in September 1999 during its bloody withdrawal from 
East Timor. 
UN and Dutch officials have carried out a detailed 
investigation into the case and a European Union diplomat 
has said: "This is probably the best documented atrocity in 
East Timor, and the one that most clearly demonstrates a 
pattern of abuse by the Indonesian military." Claims by the 
Attorney .General's office that witnesses lack credibility 
have been rejected by UNTAET. 
It is significant that the accused in the current trials are 
charged with failing to control their subordinates and no one 
has yet been charged with planning or orchestrating the 
_.violence. This fits in with the mendacious Indonesian 
version of events, which is being widely publicised during 
the trials. This version portrays the violence as either part 
of a civil war between the pro-Indonesia and pro-indepen-
dence factions or as an instinctive reaction to the loss of the 
in?~~enden.ce ballot and the perceived bias of the UN by 
m1htias actmg beyond the control of the security forces. 
A programme of technical co-operation between the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and the Indonesian government remains suspended because 
of the government's refusal to extend the jurisdiction of the 
court. As a result, much-needed judicial training is not 
being provided, justifying continued concerns about the 
lack of competence of the judges and prosecutors. 
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Inadequate witness protection 
Just a day before the start of the trials, President 
Megawati signed a decree on witness protection, which 
is wholly inadequate. The decree only provides for three 
measures of protection - protection from physical or 
mental threat (it is not clear how that is to be achieved); 
anonymity of victims/witnesses; and provision for the 
giving of evidence out of sight of the accused. It is for 
the witness/victim to request protective measures from 
the court. 
The need for proper protection has been underlined 
by the highly intimidating atmosphere of many of the 
court sessions to date. Senior generals have occupied the 
front rows of the public gallery while noisy demonstra-
tors led by militia leader, Eurico Guterres, have made 
their presence felt in and around the court room, burning 
effigies of Australian prime minister John Howard and 
denouncing the UN. 
It is questionable whether any victim or witness 
would want to testify in public in proceedings where 
there is no security in the courtroom, and where a rowdy, 
undisciplined and aggressive public audience, is repeat-
edly laughing and jeering at witnesses of whom they 
disapprove. According to observers, it has at times been 
difficult to hear the actual proceedings. 
It remains to be seen how all this will affect the 
judges, let alone witnesses traumatised by their experi-
ences at the hands of the Indonesian military and their 
militia cohorts. Already one East Timorese witness has 
failed to turn up. It is not clear how many other East 
Timorese witnesses the prosecution teams intend to call, 
but the absence of substantive evidence from East Timor 
will raise further questions about the credibility of the 
trials. 
Past crimes can be prosecuted 
In one positive development, the judges in each case 
have overruled defence lawyers' arguments that the trials 
should not proceed because of the prohibition on retroac-
tive prosecutions in the Indonesian Constitution [see 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 160, p. 16]. 
Although the judges' reasoning is somewhat 
confused, it appears to be ultimately correct. This is 
because Law 26/2000 does not create a new category of 
crimes, but recognises as crimes act~ or omissions wh!ch 
were already crimes under international law (genocide 
and crimes against humanity), and provides a means of 
prosecuting those crimes under Indonesian law. I~ is, 
therefore, arguable that Law 26/2000 and prosecu~i~ns 
under it do not offend the principle of non-retroact1vity 
in the Constitution. 
The fact that the judges referred to international crim-
inal law in their rulings is encouraging and could in itself 
be an important development for Indonesian jurispru-
dence. 
Impunity for top brass 
This positive development notwithstanding, the over-
all process is a travesty of justice. Leading human :ig~ts 
lawyer, Hendardi, i~ ~damant t~at the .blame for t~1s hes 
squarely with the m1h~ary an~ is certam th~t the ~ighest­
ranking officers implicated m the East Ttmor v10l~nce 
will not be brought to trial. 'They have been given 
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impunity because international pressure is weak,' ~e 
said. 'Power in Indonesia is not in President Megawati's 
hands, it's still held by the military.' [The Age, 30 
March]. 
The list of suspects does not include former armed 
forces commander-in-chief, General Wiranto and intel-
ligence chief Zacky Anwar Makarim, both named in the 
January 2000 report of the Indonesian Commission for 
Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM). 
Also excluded are former generals Feisal Tanjung 
who was Coordinating Minister for Security at the time 
and in overall charge of what happened in East Timor, 
AM Hendropriyono (currently Indonesia's supreme 
intelligence chief and a member of Megawati's cabinet) 
or Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin (recently 
promoted as spokesperson of the armed forces), all 
implicated in the East Timor violence by recently-
released Australian intelligence materials. 
Far from facing justice, Wiranto has used his appear-
ance in court - as a prosecution witness in the case 
against Timbul Silaen - to present a shamelessly self-
serving and distorted version of events in East Timor. 
Describing his task in assisting with security for the 
popular consultation as a "mission impossible", he 
blamed the post-ballot violence on an "emotional 
response" by the pro-Jakarta camp to the perceived 
unfairness and dishonesty of the UN-administered 
process. Testifying in the same trial, former regional 
military commander, Adam Damiri, also blamed the 
violence on cheating by UNAMET. 
Prosecution witnesses, such as Wiranto and Damiri, 
seem to have given evidence more favourable to the 
defence than the prosecution. This is not surprising 
given that prosecution lawyers are behaving more like 
defence counsel in their conduct of the trials. 
Clearly witnesses such as these will use their day in 
court, in the blaze of Indonesian media publicity, to put 
forth their version of events and defend Indonesia's 
actions, knowing full well that the East Timorese 
version is unlikely to be heard by the court and the 
Indonesian public. They may also believe that the inter-
national community, which is anxious for closure on 
East Timor, will not make much of a fuss as long as 
there are a few token convictions. 
International pressure weakens 
Concerns about the weakness of international pres-
sure on Indonesia, expressed by Hendardi and others, 
will have been reinforced by the shameful capitulation 
of the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to 
Indonesian demands that the Commission should not be 
critical of the government's efforts in dealing with the 
East Timor crimes. 
The Commission effectively gave a ringing endorse-
ment to the Indonesian process in a Chairperson's 
Statement on 19 April 2002 by welcoming the start of 
the trials and the 'important steps' taken by the 
Indonesian Government in bringing the perpetrators to 
justice. 
The CHR Statement also welcomed the agreement 
of the Indonesian and East Timorese authorities to 
strengthen co-operation on judicial matters. It ignored 
the fact that Indonesia has so far refused to co-operate, 
continued on p 26. 
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Kissinger and East Timor: More comes to light 
With Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, facing more warnings of indictment in 
more countries about his involvement in past crimes against humanity, new facts have ~ome ~o 
light about his role in giving the go-ahead to the Suharto dictatorship to invade East Timor in 
December 1975. 
On 6 December 1975, Kissinger and the US president, 
Gerald Ford, held a meeting with President Suharto during 
a brief stopover in the Indonesian capital. Less than 24 
hours later, thousands of Indonesian troops descended on 
Dili, the capital of East Timor. This was the start of an act 
of aggression that was to last for more than 24 years, leav-
ing at least 200,000 people, one third of the population, 
dead. 
Kissinger has always claimed that Indonesia's plans to 
invade East Timor were not discussed at the meeting, alleg-
ing on one occasion in 1995 that it was only 'at the airport 
as we were leaving that the Indonesians told us that they 
were going to occupy the Portuguese colony ofTimor ... . So 
when the Indonesians informed us, we neither said yes or 
no.' He also alleges that Timor did not figure in US foreign 
policy and was much too insignificant to engage the atten-
tion of his State Department 
In late 1975, the US was in the process of intensifying 
its economic and military ties with Suharto's Indonesia. 
After the humiliating collapse of the US war in Indochina in 
April of that year, it was strategically crucial for the west-
New documents released 
Until now, little has been known about a meeting on 5 
July 1975 between Suharto and Gerald Ford, attended by 
Kissinger, and its impact on Suharto's decision to go ahead 
with an invasion of East Tim or. 
Along with other hitherto classified documents, th~ offi-
cial record of this conversation between the two presidents 
at the 5 July meeting has now been made public by the US 
National Security Archive at the George Washington 
University, under the title: East Timor Revisited:. Ford 
Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion. The two presidents 
discussed US military assistance to Indonesia, foreign 
investment and Portugal's decolonisation activities. 
While paying lip-service to the principle of self-deter-
mination for East Timor, Suharto told the US president that 
independence was not viable. 'So the only way is to inte-
grate [East Timor] into Indonesia,' he told Ford. While 
saying that Indonesia did not want to interfere in East 
Timor's self-determination, he implied that it might have to 
because 'those who want independence are those who are 
ern superpower to support the largest 
anti-communist power in South East Asia 
and help to rescue it from the $10 billion 
scandal that had struck its state petroleum 
company, Pertamina. Indonesia was 
certainly a major factor in US foreign 
policy and it goes without saying that 
Indonesian plans to stage an act of 
aggression against a neighbouring terri-
tory, then still a Portuguese colony, 
would have been monitored very closely 
by the US embassy and the State 
Department. To claim therefore, as 
Kinssinger has repeatedly done, that 
Timor was too insignificant an issue for 
him to pay attention to, it simply unbe-
lievable, especially considering that the 
Indonesian army was at the time almost 
entirely dependent on military equipment 
from the US and bound, under US law, not to use this 
equipment for anything other than defence. 
Jakarta, 6December1975. Kissinger and Ford meet with Suharto 
hours before Indonesia invades East Timor. 
Yet, East Timor does not merit even a mention in the 
former secretary of state's memoirs or other books he has 
published recording his activities during his time in office. 
His attempts to airbrush East Tim or from his accounts of the 
period shows that he knows he has a great deal to hide about 
his own role in encouraging the Suharto regime to embark 
on a military venture that has entered the annals of the twen-
tieth century as one of the worst war crimes of that 
benighted century. 
Communist influenced'. Immediately after returning home, 
on 8 July 1975, Suharto publicly expressed the view for the 
first time that an independent East Timor 'is not viable'. 
[Transcript of Staff Meetings of Secretary of State 
Kissinger] 
By this time too, Indonesia's campaign of destabilisation 
in East Timor was well underway. In May, intelligence 
operatives had persuaded the UDT, the pro-Portuguese 
party, to walk out of its coalition with Fretilin. This led in 
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August to a coup attempt by the UDT, instigated by 
Indonesia, to destroy Fretilin's growing popularity. These 
events were of course widely known to the international 
community and it comes as no surprise that East Timor was 
a topic of conversation when Suharto met President Ford 
and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger in that July meet-
ing. 
Another matter raised by Suharto was a request for 
increased military assistance from the US. He needed help 
to increase the mobility of his armed forces for dealing with 
'insurgent elements', saying: 'Especially at this moment, 
inteHigence and territorial operations are very important.' In 
response, Ford proposed setting up a joint commission to 
scrutinise Suharto's military request and left it to Kissinger 
to settle the details. Kissinger knew very well that US mili-
tary equipment was supplied on condition that it would only 
be used for purposes of defence. In any case, by this time, 
ninety per cent of the equipment being used by the 
Indonesian army was from the US. 
According to a declassified document recording discus-
sions at subsequent State Department staff meetings, 
Kissinger, at a meeting on 12 August when the UDT coup 
was discussed, concurred with the view of one of his advis-
ers that an Indonesian takeover would take place 'sooner or 
later' as they would not let a 'communist-dominated group' 
(ie, Fretilin) take over. Four days later, the Australian 
ambassador in Jakarta relayed a comment by the US ambas-
sador John Newsom to the effect that, if Indonesia were to 
invade East Timor, it should do so 'effectively, quickly, and 
not use our equipment'. He must have known, as did his 
boss, Kissinger, that Indonesian troops could not possibly 
have mounted an action like that without using US equip-
ment. 
A memorandum to President Ford written by Kissinger 
on 21 November 1975 in preparation for Ford's visit to 
Indonesia gave East Timor a low priority, being last on the 
topics mentioned. The memo said that Indonesia was 
'manoeuvering' to absorb East Timor through negotiations 
with Portugal and 'covert military operations in the colony 
itself. Kissinger apparently did not expect an overt inva-
sion, as this would violate US law regarding the use of US-
supplied military equipment. An accompanying briefing 
paper suggested that this consideration had induced 
'restraint' on Jakarta. 
The 6 December meeting 
While still in Beijing and about to depart for Jakarta, 
Kissinger received a cable from the State Department refer-
ring to Indonesia's 'plans' to invade East Timor. It would 
therefore have come as no surprise when Suharto brought 
up East Timor at the meeting with Ford on 6 December, 
claiming that the current situation would 'prolong the 
suffering of the refugees and increase stability in the area'. 
(The refugees were the pro-UDT East Timorese who had 
fled across the border into West Timor following a month of 
hostilities between the UDT and Fretilin following the UDT 
coup. UDT leaders had already been forced to sign a state-
ment on 30 November, agreeing to their country's integra-
tion with Indonesia.) 
The cable from the US embassy to Washington that 
reported on the discussion between Suharto, Ford and 
Kissinger, quoted Suharto as complaining that Fretilin had 
'declared independence unilaterally'. He then said: 'We want 
EASTTIMOR 
your understanding if we r WA 
deem it necessary to take I _ 
rapid or drastic action' . 
Ford's response was unam-
--!'\. biguous: 'We will under-
stand and will not press you 
on the issue'. Kissinger 
admitted that 'the use of US-
made arms could create 
problems' but added: 'It 
depends on how we construe 
it; whether it is in self 
defence or is a foreign oper-
ation.' He then went on: 'It is 
important that whatever you 
do succeeds quickly.' Here 
we have Kissinger conspir-
ing with the Indonesian 
dictator to prevent the inva-
sion from becoming a big 
issue.. 'If you have made 
plans,' he said, 'we will do 
our best to keep everyone 
quiet until the President 
returns.' 
For Kissinger to claim, 
when questioned about his and Ford's talks with Suharto on 
6 December, the day before the Indonesian invasion, that 
East Timor was not discussed and he only heard about it at 
the airport 'as we were leaving', is a blatant lie. The question 
had been put by Constancio Pinto, an East Timorese then 
living in the US, after Kissinger spoke at the launch of one 
of his books in New York. 
The charade of halting arms sales 
After returning to Washington from Jakarta, Kissinger 
had to deal with the problem of Indonesia's unlawful use of 
US-supplied weapons for the invasion. He discovered to his 
utter annoyance that senior members of his staff had written 
and circulated a memo setting out this problem and 
concluding that US military aid to the Indonesian armed 
forces would have to be cut off. This led to a fierce row 
between the secretary of state and his staff at a meeting on 
18 December 1975. 
Kissinger's main fear was that the memo would fall into 
the hands of members of Congress and journalists, and also 
lambasted his aides for revealing that he, their boss, was at 
odds with members of his staff. As to whether there should 
be a cut-off in arms deliveries because of the invasion, his 
staff asked what the Department should say to Congress if 
the matter was raised. Kssinger's reply was quite straigh-
forward and blunt. 'We cut it off while we are studying it. 
We intend to start again in January.' Which is indeed what 
happened. 
There is now clear and indisputable evidence that along-
side his many other crimes, former US Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger stands accused of giving the go-ahead to 
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. One day, he will be 
forced to account for this, there is no doubt. 
* 
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NGOs' role at Rights Commission under threat 
This year's 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights was a huge disappointment for 
NGOs lobbying for improved protection of human rights in Indonesia and elsewhere. There are 
now real concerns about attempts by certain countries to diminish the role of NGOs and silence 
the voice of victims around the world. 
NGOs have always had to confront the fact that the 
Commission is a political body which often makes 
pronouncements detennined more by international politics 
than by a concern to promote human rights. This year's 
Chairperson's Statement on East Timar is a case in point 
[see separate article on Jakarta trials]. Despite this, NGOs 
have until now had some success in raising country-specific 
concerns by means of interventions and lobbying for coun-
try-specific resolutions. 
The experiences of many at this year's session -
described by High Commissioner, Mary Robinson, as 'very 
difficult' - have, however, led NGOs to question whether 
their effectiveness is under attack and likely to be reduced 
in future. 
The work of NGOs was made almost impossible by a 
directive from the UN Secretariat in New York which 
banned evening meetings of the Commission, supposedly 
for financial reasons. All oral interventions were initially 
cut back by 30 per cent. and NGOs had only three-and-a-
half minutes to speak instead of five. Towards the end of 
the session, NGOs' allotted time was further reduced to one 
minute 45 seconds. Government delegates were also under 
greater time pressure and were at times difficult to meet, 
especially as the Commission held numerous meetings in 
closed session. 
Acehnese activist walks out in protest 
The time restraints quickly caused the Commission to 
fall way behind schedule. Eventually a point was reached 
on item 9 (which deals with country-specific concerns) 
when the chairperson decided to discontinue the debate 
with the result that dozens of NGOs were unable to speak. 
In response, a disgusted Acehnese activist walked out of the 
session in protest at this abuse of NGOs' rights. Afridal 
Darmi, from the Banda Aceh Legal Aid Foundation, repre-
senting the Dutch NGO, NOVIB, stated at a plenary session 
of the Commission: 'out of solidarity with my NGO 
colleagues who have come from very far away and have 
spent lots of money to attend this session, but who have not 
been given their rights and an opportunity to speak, I refuse 
to read out my statement. .. ' He added: 'In the name of soli-
darity with all the victims of human rights abuses in the 
world, I truly hope that conditions at the Commission in the 
future will be much better.' 
The statement was received with rapturous applause 
from all the NGOs present, and Pax Romana, whose tum 
was next, also refused to speak. 
Even UN special rapporteurs and other thematic 
mandate holders were unable to speak before the 
Commission and were fo.r~ced to submit written reports on 
their work. 
A joint statement issued by a number of NGOs on 10 
April condemned this 'unprecedented negation of the voice 
and effective participation of victims' in the Commission. 
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'We have come to Geneva with enormous sacrifices and 
unexpectedly we have found the door closed against us. We 
are returning to our countries with empty hands. It is 
gravely unjust that our participation should be of so little 
importance to the 58th HRC. Yet without the presence of 
the voice of the victims and their representatives this 
Commission will have no reason for its existence,' they 
said. 
Such problems did not affect visiting dignitaries who 
were allowed (and often exceeded) a generous 15 minutes 
for speeches which were little more than public relations 
exercises for their governments. With a blatant disregard 
for the facts, Indonesia's minister of justice and human 
rights, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, claimed in a speech on 27 
March that Indonesia: ' ... has been remarkably successful in 
dealing with the complex problems besetting it on a number 
of fronts. Indeed the outbreak of horizontal conflicts and 
the existence of separatism in far-flung provinces have been 
successfully addressed using a battery of comprehensive 
means. Today, our endeavours to refonn the country and 
our commitment to the democratic process are beginning to 
bear fruit, as witnessed by tangible results in the enhance-
ment of the national capacity to respond to the aspirations 
of the people and to deal with conflicts.' 
Asian bloc on the offensive 
Earlier, in the first week of the session, an intervention 
by the Japanese ambassador had provided a strong indica-
tion of an attempt by the Asian bloc to undennine the work 
of the Commission and the role of NGOs. His call for the 
Commission to avoid politicisation of its work with specific 
reference to item 9 was interpreted as a call for reduced 
debate about the human rights situation in particular coun-
tries [see 'Incapacitating the CHR: Asian bloc's ongoing 
agenda' in Human Rights Features, 22 March - 1 April 
2002, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre]. It 
seems that his wish was granted by the later events 
described above. 
Ironically this pressure for the de-politicisation of 
Commission is being exerted after the powers of the Sub-
Commission - which is made up of independent human 
rights experts and is therefore inherently less political than 
the Commission - were recently reduced because it was too 
effective at raising country-specific issues. That led to a 40 
per cent. reduction in NGO participation in sub-
Commission debate on certain agenda items. 
In an attack on NGO freedom, the Japanese ambassador 
stated: 'there have been instances where NGO accreditation 
procedures have not been fully complied with and some-
times even exploited or misused to advance interests 
outside the scope of human rights ... cases of NGOs 
misleading fellow NGO representatives into unwittingly 
subscribing to spurious documents for circulation in the 
Commission ... ' 
continued on p 26 
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Violence flares up again in Maluku 
Renewed acts of violence have occurred in Ambon despite a peace accord brokered by Indonesian cabinet 
ministers in February. On 28 April, well-armed Muslim gangs attacked a Christian village near the city of 
Ambon, killing 14 people and injuring scores. Laskar Jihad commander has threatened a 'war against 
separatism' while Jakarta says it may declare martial law in Maluku, giving wide-ranging powers to the 
army. 
The deadly conflict in Maluku dates back to January 
1999 and has taken the lives of at least 5,000 people while 
an estimated 700,000 people have fled their homes to 
become displaced people. 
The peace accord known as Malino II (the second of two 
accords between Christian and Muslim communities, the 
first being an accord reached between the two communities 
in Poso, Central Sulawesi) which was signed by leaders 
from the two communities on 12 February this year did not 
inspire a great deal of confidence. Militant Muslim groups 
and Christian militias were not involved in the talks and the 
authorities refused to incorporate grassroots groups where 
conflict resolution is most vital. Moreover, although the 
accord stipulated that outside groups should leave the 
province, nothing has been done to put this into effect. 
The conflict in Maluku intensified in 2000 after 
members of the militant Islamic organisation, Laskar Jihad, 
arrived in Ambon in large numbers, after receiving training 
in West Java. They departed very publicly from Surabaya, 
East Java, while the armed forces did nothing to prevent 
them from leaving. Their continued presence in Maluku is 
in contravention of the Malino peace accord but according 
to the Straits Times [29 April], the authorities have done 
nothing to expel or disarm these men, because of the 
perception that its leader, Jafar Umar Thalib enjoys support 
even in government circles. 
According to Munir of Kontras, the Commission for the 
Disappeared and Victims of Violence, the Malino peace 
accord will not resolve anything because civil society 
organisations were excluded from the discussions and the 
accord was nothing more than an agreement between 
bureaucrats. 
After the accord was signed, there were a few weeks of 
calm but on 31 March, a bomb exploded in Ambon city, 
killing seven people, injuring fifty-five and destroying a 
hotel. The governor's office was also destroyed by fire. 
Local observers were convinced that the explosive device 
used must have been the work of persons with military 
skills and members of the armed forces were suspected of 
involvement. These suspicions were reinforced when a 
black Orari walkie-talkie, routinely used by the army and 
the police, fell from a van as it sped away from the scene of 
the atrocity. 
After this incident, some commentators observed that 
the aim was probably to show that the state of civil emer-
gency was ineffective and that the armed forces would have 
to be given a much more prominent role in this violence-
tom territory. 
Tensions increased when the chairperson of an organisa-
tion calling for the establishment of a South Mal_uku 
Republic (RMS) was arrested, followed by demonstrat101.1s 
calling for his release. The RMS movement was crushed m 
the early 1950s and has hardly reverberated in the interven-
ing period. On 25 April, the anniversary of the day when the 
RMS was proclaimed 52 years ago, the RMS flag was 
unfurled in some places, provoking counter protests. 
Support for the RMS is known to be very limited today 
but it now appears that elements within the military are 
happy to use its re-emergence as a way of pointing to grow-
ing separatist sentiments and fuelling Muslim discontent. 
Villagers killed at dawn 
The shocking attack on the village of Soya on 28 April 
has once again thrown the spotlight on the unresolved 
conflict in Maluku. A gang of a dozen or so heavily-armed 
men with their faces painted black attacked the village at 
4am killing fourteen people, including women and an eight-
month-old baby. The attackers wore uniforms and carried 
army standard-issue M-16 rifles . A local priest said they 
yelled 'Allahhu Akbar', brandishing weapons and firing 
guns, mortars and homemade bombs as they rampaged 
through the village. Two days prior to the attack, Laskar 
Jihad commander, Jafar Umar Thaild had made a highly 
inflammatory call for Muslims to 'wage war on Christians'. 
Twenty-three houses, a church and the village hall were 
destroyed in the attack. Security forces were nowhere to be 
seen while the attack was in progress and did not arrive on 
the scene till more than two hours later, by which time the 
attackers had left. Christian community leaders were justi-
fiably angry at the failure of the security forces to prevent 
this attack and to be so tardy in their response. 
According to Media Indonesia, the village was targeted 
because an RMS flag had been unfurled there on 25 April 
and the villagers had 'done nothing' to prevent this from 
happening. 
There have been accusations of military involvement in 
the attack which have been strenuously denied. Soya 
villagers were among those making these accusations, 
which reflects the fact that Christian communities in 
Maluku do not trust the security forces and believe that they 
are siding with the Muslims. 
Laskar Jihad wants to fight separatism 
On the day of the Soya atrocity, the commander of 
Laskar Jihad, Jafar Umar Thalid, in a speech to a large 
crowd of supporters in a mosque in Ambon, again sought to 
foment conflict between Muslims and Christians in 
Indonesia. He declared his total dedication to NKRI, the 
unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, alleging that 
Christians were the ones stirring up rebellion against the 
Republic. 
The occasion was also used to issue a 'declaration of 
war' against separatism everywhere in Indonesia, against 
the RMS in Maluku, the OPM in West Papua and GAM in 
Aceh. This must be seen as a very real threat in Maluku and 





in West Papua where Jihad forces have been building bases 
for months (see separate article). However, in Aceh, Jihad 
members were compelled to retreat some months ago, after 
a strong rebuff from GAM. 
This highly inflammatory speech comes from a man 
whose forces should long since have been driven out of 
Maluku. Serious questions need to be answered as to who is 
giving protection to them and providing them with 
weapons, funds and training. By promoting such a danger-
ous force, elements within the military hope to fuel the 
conflict in the province, creating 'threats to security' that 
would justify intensifying security measures. 
Chriistian community leaders have been urging the 
authorities to arrest the Laskar Jihad commander, and 
although Governor Saleh Latuconsina, who exercises 
special powers under the civil emergency in Maluku, has 
made known his intentions to order Jafar's arrest, he says 
that this won't be easy because of the 'local consequences'. 
Jafar's legal team has declared that they will never hand 
over their client to any arresting authority and warned that 
physical means will be used to protect him. There had been 
plans to arrest him for a long while, the governor said, but 
the authorities were 'still waiting for the security forces to 
be ready for such a move'. [AFP, 1 May 2002] The gover-
nor could hardly have made it clearer that the security 
forces are in fact protecting J afar. 
Martial law wont solve anything 
The latest atrocity has led senior ministers and armed 
forces generals to suggest that martial law is no~ ~he only 
alternative for Maluku. Eighteen months ago, ~ c1v1l en:ier-
gency was declared in the province but it has s~gnally fa1.led 
to end the bloodshed. Among those making this suggest10n 
were Minister Co-ordinator for Security and Political Affairs, 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and army chi~f-of-staff, 
General Endirartono Sutarto. Susilo Bambang claims that he 
has been inundated with demands from civil groups in 
Maluku, and also from the governor to introduce martial law. 
The introduction of martial law would convey the 
message that the civilian authorities are powe~l~ss to keep 
control, providing further justification for the m1ht.ary to take 
over. Yet, there has been no lack of security forces m Maluku, 
and additional troops were brought in after the Malino accord 
was signed. The widely-held view is that the military and the 
police in Maluku have been signally incapable of maintain 
law and order. Martial law will give wide-ranging powers to 
the military to act at will, suspending laws that protect basic 
rights. However, as long as the roots of the conflict in Maluku 
are allowed to fester, the chances of ending the violence are 
bleak. 
[For an analysis of the background to this conflict, see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 151, March 1999, No. 156 
January/February 2000, No 158. June 2000, No 161 
March/April 2001 and No. 162 July/August 2001.] * 
Building solidarity for Aceh 
As the human rights situation in Aceh continues to deteriorate, moves have been made to revitalise 
international solidarity/ or the people of Ac eh with a meeting held in Banda Ac eh. The meeting 
took place behind closed doors, to avoid being disrupted by the security/ orces which had a day 
earlier banned a seminar to discuss the progress in the talks process between Indonesia and GAM. 
Two days after the police in Aceh had banned a semi-
nar that was to have discussed how the talks on resolving 
the conflict in Aceh are faring and how to ensure greater 
civil society participation in the process, a closed meeting 
took place in Banda Aceh to revitalise SCHRA, the 
Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh. 
SCHRA was set up in July 1999 in Bangkok but failed 
to coordinate the activities of many solidarity groups 
around the world effectively. The meeting in Banda Aceh 
on Sunday 5 May took place in a very tense atmosphere, 
with participants being taken to the venue in small groups, 
to avoid police detection. 
There was strong representation from Indonesian 
human rights NGOs, including Bonar Tigor Naipospos 
from Solidamor (Solidarity Without Borders), Hendardi 
from PBHI, the human rights study and advocacy organi-
sation, Ori Rahman from Kontras, Commission for the 
Disappeared and the Victims of Violence, a representative 
from Imparsial, a Jakarta-based NGO devoted to support-
ing Aceh and Natcom, a Medan-based NGO. Such strong 
Indonesian participation is crucially important, to build 
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far greater understanding among Indonesians about the 
horrors being inflicted on the people of Aceh in the name 
of Indonesia's territorial integrity. Other NGOs represented 
were from Australia, the US, Japan, the Philippines and 
Europe. 
In view of the difficult situation in the city, Acehnese 
activists decided to limit their participation at the meeting 
to five persons, who submitted a four-page document 
outlining their wishes for the future programme of inter-
national solidarity. As the discussions wore on, more and 
more Acehnese came, eager to follow the discussions. 
The agenda for the one-day meeting was very packed 
because of the lack of regular meetings and also because of 
the grave deterioration in the political and economic situa-
tion in Aceh, as a result of intensified military operations 
underway in the past two years. When SCHRA was set up 
in 1999, there was still a degree of democratic space in 
Aceh which is no longer true. The meeting was also taking 
place just a few days before talks between the Indonesian 
government and GAM were due to resume in Geneva on 8 
May. 
continued on p 24. 
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Shadow of a Revolution: Indonesia and 
the Generals, by Roland Challis, Sutton 
Publishing Ltd, 2001. 
How better to start a review of this very committed book 
than to quote the author's dedication: 
Dedicated with respect to the memory of more than one 
million Indonesians who died and are still dying because of 
the greed, brutality and indifference of the military, politi-
cians, corporations and 'statesmen' of all nations. 
Books by journalists about Indonesia are all too few and 
far between, as compared for instance with the flood of 
books that have been published in the past year or so about 
East Timor. That there is so much to say about East Timor 
following the dramatic events of 1999 is indisputable. Yet 
Indonesia too has passed through many dramatic events 
since the 1997 financial crisis, and the removal from power 
in May 1998 of the dictator, Suharto, who ran the country 
with an iron rod for more than three decades. Which is why 
this book is so welcome. 
What Roland Challis has produced is not just a survey of 
the years under the Suharto dictatorship, which are well 
covered in his concluding chapters. He has taken the trou-
ble to set the scene of the generals' take-over in 1965 
against a historical background, looking at the development 
of Indonesia as a nation-state which has coloured subse-
BOOK REVIEW 
~ ---
quent developments. In particular, he provides a compre-
hensive overview of Indonesia's konfrontasi with Malaysia 
fron: 1963 till 1965, regarding which he is particularly well 
qualified as he was the BBC's correspondent in Southeast 
Asia throughout that period. 
As he shows, at a time when British forces in North 
~orneo were escalating operations and were given permis-
sion to carry out incursions across the border into 
Indonesian territory, there were two quite separate 
approaches being made from Jakarta to end the conflict. 
One was from Sukarno who sent senior members of his 
cabinet for secret talks with Malaysia, while another, dating 
back to mid-1964, was pursued by Suharto loyalists behind 
President Sukarno's back and only became public several 
years later. Meanwhile, on the ground in Indonesian 
Kalimantan, troops that had been dispatched there were not 
being deployed, indicating, as Brig.General Supardjo told a 
military court while or trial for his part in the 1 October 
1965 coup attempt, 'that some army leaders were not keen 
on the confrontation', an obvious reference to Suharto who 
was then in charge of troop deployment to the 'front'. 
Challis also documents the fact that British military officers 
and the British government realised by early 1965 that 
Indonesian's campaign was running out of steam. 
While acknowledging that many aspects of the events of 
1 ~ctober 1965 are still shrouded in mystery, Challis deals 
with the developments leading to Suharto's formal assump-
tion of the pr~sidency in 1968 in three distinct stages, the 
coup attempt itself, the brutal extermination of communists 
presided over by sections of the army, and the gradual 
p_roc.ess of removing Sukarno from power. However, one 
sigmficant error of fact needs correcting. Challis records 
that the newspaper of the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI), Karian Rakjat, made a 'misjudgement' by coming out 
on the 2 October in support of the putsch. In fact, that news-
paper was the only non army paper allowed to appear on 
that day, with an editorial written while events were still 
un~oldii:g, ~nd describing them as an 'internal army affair'. 
This editorial later enabled the army to claim that the PKI 
was involved in the events and suggests that the paper's 
appearance was quite deliberate. 
The UK's black propaganda campaign 
The most intriguing section of Challis' account of the 
1965 events relates to the activities of the UK's propaganda 
agenc~, the Information Research Department, which set up 
office m Singapore less than a month after the coup attempt. 
The IRD head Norman Reddaway, one of the Foreign 
Office's most senior propaganda specialists, took charge, 
and worked in close collaboration with Andrew Gilchrist 
the UK ambassador in Jakarta, in a campaign to spread lie~ 
and distortions as the massacre of hundreds of thousands of 
communist suspects gathered pace throughout Indonesia. 
As the BBC correspondent in Southeast Asia Roland 
Challis was a prime target of this campaign and w;s told by 
Reddaway many years later, as he began to work on this 
book, that his terms of reference were to 'do anything you 
can think of to get rid of Sukarno'. Many of the accounts 
spread by the IRD to journalists in the region were simply 
re-cycled reports that had been received from the ambas-
sador. This even led to the ambassador complaining, 
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according to a recently declassified letter from Reddaway to 
Gilchrist when the latter was writing his memoirs, recalling 
that the ambassador had on one occasion complained 'that the 
versions put back [by the IRD, and hence used in the press} 
were uncomfortably close to those put out by yourself [ie, 
Gilchrist]', and causing Reddaway to wonder 'whether this was 
the first time in history that an Ambassador had been able to 
address the people in his country of work almost at will and 
virtually instantaneously'. Challis also writes: 'While MI6 
agents 'came and went at will' between Jakarta and other 
regional capitals, other journalists, including himself, were kept 
out, and forced to rely on handouts from the IRD. 'The control 
of information was rigorous,' writes Challis. 'No word of the 
slaughter came my way.' 
If one casts one's mind back to those horrendous events and 
to the lack of reporting in the world's press about the massacre 
of communists, it explains why Suharto was able to seize power 
with virtually no mention of the crime against humanity he 
committed to eliminate a potential opposition to military power. 
Even today, the repercussions are evident: rarely does Suharto's 
name appear when journalists or academics survey the worst 
cases of genocide or massacres from the twentieth century. 
The IRD's strategy was threefold: to target the PKI, to tar 
Sukarno with the communist brush and to provide documentary 
support for Suharto's interpretation of the events of 1 October. 
They were stunningly successful, as Challis shows. 
Suharto's tyrannical rule 
The second half of this highly readable book deals compre-
hensively with the Suharto era. A chapter on Suharto's Javanese 
empire provides an overview of the dictator's moves to exploit 
the fabulous natural resources in the non-Javanese regions of 
the Republic. Challis rightly has nothing but contempt for the 
term 'outer islands' so often used for everything except Java 
(including West Java, where the people are Sundanese, not 
Javanese), calling it a phrase 'loaded with assumptions of 
Javanese superiority'. The conflict in Aceh led to desperate 
attempts, already under Sukarno, to curb secessionist sympa-
thies though the rebel movement under Daud Beureuh in the 
1950s was focused on calling for Indonesia to become an 
Islamic republic, rather than supporting the idea of an Islamic 
Republic of Aceh, as the author suggests. 
As for West Papua, western powers made no secret (in secret 
documents, of course) of their contempt for West Papuan aspi-
rations, in the months preceding the so-called Act of Free 
Choice in August 1969. As one British diplomat wrote, 'I cannot 
imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch or Australian governments 
putting at risk their economic and political relations with 
Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small 
number of very primitive people' . · 
Suharto's unbridled exploitation of the hugely rich regions 
beyond Java under Javanese control are briefly covered, as well 
as the invasion of East Timer, shortly after Suharto had 
proclaimed (as we now know, following a meeting in the US in 
early July 1975 with President Gerald Ford and Kissinger) that 
independence 'was not a viable option' for the Portuguese 
colony. When asked at the time what he might do if Indonesia 
invaded East Timer, the Australian prime minister, Malcolm 
Fraser replied, 'absolutely nothing'. 
However, the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, as 
Challis records, caused reverberations around the world, and 
'started processes that would strike at the very heart of General 
Suharto's military regime'. 
After dealing in some depth with the human rights (and 
wrongs) situation, the author described the dictator's str.a~­
egy over the more than three decades of his rule t? play m.11t-
tary and political forces against each other, wh1l.e keep1~g 
himself in power and building for himself, his family and his 
cronies a huge business empire. His account of Suharto's 
moves in the late 1980s to curb the military and build an 
alliance with Muslims, who earlier had been the target of 
many brutal crackdowns, are a reminder of Suharto's 
shrewdness as a political operator. 
For the general reader who wants to understand Indonesian 
contemporary history up to the downfall of Suharto in 1998, 
this book is highly recommended. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
continued from p 22. 
The meeting strongly condemned the police ban 
issued two days earlier, preventing the holding of a one-
day seminar to assess the progress of the talks. [See sepa-
rate article.] This decision, a totally unwarranted viola-
tion of the Acehnese people's freedom of expression, cast 
serious doubt over Indonesia's real intentions regarding 
efforts to seek a peaceful solution to the bitter conflict. In 
fact, as the meeting was taking place, Indonesian security 
forces launched an attack on a suspected GAM base less 
than 10 kms from Banda Aceh, killing four people. Also, 
eight students were arrested in the city for participating in 
a small protest against security force brutalities in Aceh. 
Among the topics discussed was the question of 
protection for human rights defenders and finding more 
opportunities for Acehnese activists to travel abroad to 
undertake speaking tours and to obtain training in a vari-
ety of related matters. Efforts to support civil society in 
Aceh was also discussed, including giving support to the 
Acehnese Civil Society Task Force set up late last year. A 
great deal of attention was also given to carrying out 
research projects about the grave human rights situation 
in Aceh. The meeting also made a strong call for account-
ability and justice, and an end to the impunity that still 
allows the security forces to conduct their operations and 
violations at will. 
The meeting decided to re-structure SCHRA and 
build it into a powerful non-Acehnese international soli-
darity organisation. SCHRA is now a broad coalition or 
umbrella of non-Acehnese organisations from all over the 
world, but with strong participation from Jakarta- and 
Medan-based organisations. 
A steering committee was set up with representatives 
from TAPOL from the UK, Ninja from Japan, Imparsial 
from Jakarta, Natcom from Medan, and IID (Initiative for 
International Dialogue) from Davao City, Mindanao in 
The Philippines. It is hoped that the Steering Committee 
will be further strengthened in the near future by the 
inclusion of representatives from Australia, from the 
Indonesian Human Rights Network in Washington and 
from Suaram in Kuala Lumpur.* 
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Indonesia's first rights activist passes away 
During the dark early years of the Suharto era, there were 
very few Indonesians who dared to speak out and take 
action on behalf of the hundreds of thousands of men and 
women who were victims of one of the world's harshest 
regimes. The shining exception was Johannes Comelis 
Princen, known affectionately as Poncke who passed away 
in March after many years of illness. 
Poncke was a fearless individual, who had deep convic-
tions about justice and the evils of repression, and saw it as 
his moral responsibility to speak out against the men in 
power, whoever they may be. He did this under Sukarno, 
and after Suharto came to power in 1965, he was the first to 
draw attention to the killings of alleged communists as early 
as 1968. That was when reports were received that hundreds 
of political prisoners who had been rounded up in 1965 
were taken to a plantation in Purwodadi, Central Java and 
put to death. His exposure incurred the wrath of the army 
and attempts to publish his findings in the Indonesian press 
were thwarted. This was at a time when literally nothing 
was being said in Indonesia about the injustice of Suharto's 
brutal crackdown on the Communist Party. Being himself a 
devout Muslim and an existentialist in outlook, he clearly 
understood the universality of human rights. 
Poncke was born in The Hague in 1925. During the Nazi 
occupation, he joined the resistance, was caught and spent 
time in a concentration camp. After the end of the war, he 
was conscripted into the Dutch army and was sent to 
Indonesia to take part in what the Dutch colonial power 
called a 'police action' in 1948. It didn't take him long to 
realise that he was fighting on the wrong side, so he 
deserted and threw his lot in with Indonesians defending the 
Republic. This turned him into a traitor in Dutch eyes and 
for many years, he was not allowed to visit the country, 
because of a campaign of vilification by army veterans who 
were (and still are) a vocal force in the country. 
It was not long before he threw in his lot with his new 
homeland, became an Indonesian citizen, won a seat in 
Parliament, and became a Muslim. 
Confronting the regime in Geneva 
I well remember being with him in Geneva where he had 
come to attend the UN Human Rights Commission some 
time in the early 1990s to speak about Indonesia. His inten-
tion was to go to Holland afterwards to visit his many rela-
tives there but he was refused a visa and was forced to 
arrange a rendez-vous with them across the border in 
Germany. With journalists constantly buzzing around him 
for interviews about his fight with the Dutch authorities, his 
attention was frequently distracted from the work of the 
Commission. 
It was in 1966 that he set up Indonesia's very first human 
rights organisation, LPHAM, the Institute for the Defence 
of Human Rights, along with Yap Thiam Hien, one of the 
country's foremost lawyers. The organisation had little in 
the way of resources but Poncke as its director spoke out on 
numerous occasions. He was also a founder of the Legal 
Aid Institute (LBH) in 1980 and remained on its board of 
advisers until serious illness incapacitated him in the final 
years of his life. 
There was no issue that escaped his attention and he 
never for a moment considered whether speaking out might 
Poncke Princen with Carmel Budiardjo and behind, Tri Agus 
and Poncke's wife. 
damage him personally. His personal initiatives were 
endless and breathtaking. The full story of his LPHAM 
would provide a comprehensive account of the human 
rights record of the Suharto regime. 
He was arrested during the student demonstrations in 
1974, when students were demonstrating against the visit of 
the Japanese prime minister, and again during the student 
protest movement in 1978. In 1983, he wrote an open letter 
to Suharto protested against death squad activities in East 
Java, the so-called 'mysterious killings'. Princen exploded 
the myth, saying there was nothing mysterious about this 
because soldiers were known to be rounding up 'criminals', 
trussing them in sacks and taking them away to be killed. 
In 1989, Ponske was the first Indonesian ever to try to 
attend a meeting of the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission 
to testify against Indonesia., but was prevented from leav-
ing Indonesia. He had planned to protest about the killings 
of Muslims in Lampung in February 1989 and about the 
worsening human rights situation in East Timor. 
Supporter of the East Timorese 
In 1989, on the occasion of the Pope's visit to East Timor, 
he wrote to the Pope urging him to 'convince the Indonesian 
government to stop arresting and detaining people who do 
not fully support integration with Indonesia'. The letter, like 
so much else that he did, never got so much as a mention in 
the Indonesian press. In 1990, he was the first person to set 
up an independent trade union association called the 
Solidarity Free Trade Union, intended as a union 'free from 
the influence of industry, employers and the government.' 
The union collapsed under the weight of internal disputes, 
but it had shown the way for Mochtar Pakpahan's more 
successful move, with the SBSI. 
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When he visited Portugal in 1993 to discuss with the 
Portuguese authorities the fate of seven East Timorese seek-
ing asylum abroad, he was attacked for being a 'traitor' 
(sounds famil iar!) by no less a person that former general 
Ali Said, who had just been appointed to head Indonesia's 
National Human Rights Commission. This visit to Portugal 
came after attending a session of the UN Human Rights 
Sub-Commission at which he lambasted Indonesia, describ-
ing East Timor as an 'endless story of violent violations of 
human rights' and also condemned the 'wave of extra-judi-
cial killings, "disappearances", arbitrary detentions without 
trial and unfair trials (that have) occurred on a massive 
scale'. 
In the 1990s, dozens of East Timorese fleeing the horrors 
of the Indonesian occupation, leapt over the fences of many 
embassies in Jakarta, demanding political asylum. This 
required negotiation between Jakarta and the Portuguese 
authorities who were always willing to take such fugitives 
in, provided that safe conduct to an airport could be guar-
anteed. On one occasion, seven East Timorese had taken 
refuge in several Scandinavian embassies but were ordered 
to leave the premises. It was Poncke who decided to take 
them to his own home. As Jose Amorim Diaz said in a 
special tribute, 'this humble human being, full of compas-
sion and humour .... open his doors and windows to the 
persecuted East Timorese at risk of his own life'. 
Frail body, indomitable will 
When I visited Indonesia in June 2000 after having been 
removed from the blacklist that had kept me out of the 
country for 29 years, the first person I went to visit was 
Poncke. By this time, he was a shadow of his former self. 
He had suffered several severe strokes, he was paralysed 
down his left side and unable to cope with his own personal 
needs. His face was disfigured from an operation for skin 
cancer. When I was about to leave for a visit to a woman 
with whom I had spent years in prison, he insisted on join-
ing me which required delicate preparations to dress him 
and help him onto a vehicle. He also insisted on knowing 
where else I would be going during the next few days and 
there he was, helped and supported by a loving wife and a 
housemaid. Physical frailty had not diminished his spirits 
one iota. 
I mourn the passing of an endlessly compassionate man 
and celebrate a life that is an inspiration to human rights 
defenders not only in Indonesia but throughout the world. 
Carmel Budiardjo 
continued from p 20. 
The attack was joined by the Indonesian ambassador, 
Nugroho Wisnumurti, who in a speech on 19 March stated: 
'a number of them [NGOs] nevertheless repeatedly resort to 
certain tactics which are uncalled for and in some cases 
improper. We are referring in particular to practices which 
include, among others, targeting countries during proceed-
ings and distributing slanderous materials for political 
ends.' He called for the Commission's secretariat to' ... deter 
any misuse of UN resources by certain parties for politi-
cally-motivated propaganda'. 
US back on board 
A few day after the end of the session, it was announced 
that the US has been voted back onto the 53-member 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
continued from p 17. 
most notably in refusing to transfer to East Ti~or suspe~ts 
indicted there for crimes against humanity, despite an obl.1g-
ation to do so under a Memorandum of Understanding 
signed in April 2000. 
The Statement made no reference to the flaws in the 
Indonesian process and exerted no pressure on Indonesia to 
ensure that justice is done. The State~ent also t~ok ~o 
account of the critical link between the cnmes committed m 
East Timor and ongoing violations in Ace?, West Pap.ua, 
and elsewhere in Indonesia. Grave violat10ns are bemg 
committed by the same institutions, and in s?me c~ses t~e 
same individuals, as were responsible for senous cnmes m 
East Timor. The continued freedom of prominent suspects 
encourages others to expect that they will enjoy impunity 
for past and future crimes, however heinous. . 
Significantly, the CHR also ignored a repo~ made to 1t 
by the UN High Commissioner for Hum.an Rights, M~ry 
Robinson, which called upon the international comm~mty 
to 'reconsider the recommendations of the Internat10nal 
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, including that 
concerning the establishment by the United Nations of an 
international human rights tribunal' . 
The East Timor NGO Forum and all major East 
Timorese NGOs have repeatedly called for an international 
tribunal and have expressed anger at Indonesia's lack of 
action against those responsible for organising the violence. 
Indonesian NGOs who have followed the process 
closely have also concluded that an international tribunal is 
necessary. In a document prepared for the CHR, they 
referred to the establishment of the ad hoc court as paying 
'mere lip service' to the implementation of human rights in 
Indonesia. They say it is clear that the ad hoc court is not 
capable of bringing justice to the victims of human rights 
violation in East Timor and call for the international 
community to take 'concrete steps in the preparation of an 
International Tribunal for East Timor' [see "Combating the 
climate of impunity: An end to the politics of violence and 
torture in Indonesia" - Indonesian NGO Delegation to the 
58th session of the UNCHR, March/April 2002]. 
The legal and moral arguments in favour of an interna-
tional tribunal are overwhelming. Indonesia's current 
process is not a means to justice, but a denial of justice. The 
international community must not betray the East Timorese 
once again by sanctioning the process and allowing the 
truth of what happened to remain suppressed forever. * 
Commission. It lost its seat last year for the first time in the 
Commission's history. The US government has a reputation 
for undermining the effectiveness of international organisa-
tions and spent much of this year's session - in its capacity 
as an observer - lobbying against a mission by the Human 
Rights High Commissioner to the occupied territories in 
Palestine and against an initiative aimed at ensuring the 
protection of human rights in relation to the fight against 
terrorism. 
Unfortunately, it seems there may be more difficult times 
ahead for those endeavouring to ensure that the Commission 
fulfils its role in providing a voice for victims and setting 
standards for the promotion and protection of human rights 
around the world. * 
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West Papua campaign launched at UN 
On 26 March, an international campaign to persuade UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan to review 
the UN's conduct in relation the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1968..;69 was launched by West Papuans 
and solidarity activists at the UN in New York. A formal submission was made based on detailed 
research of official records, which confirm that the process::· was a complete sham and flagrant 
denial of West Papua's right to self-determination. -
The delegation launching the campaign, including 
TAPOL's Carmel Budiardjo and representatives of West 
Papua's leading human rights organisation, ELS-HAM, 
presented a petition to senior UN officials and met with the 
influential US Council on Foreign Relations and diplomats 
from a number of Pacific Island missions who agreed to 
monitor Kofi Annan's response. The eight-page petition is 
supported by thirteen original documents on which the peti-
tion is based. (Several years ago, the UN conducted inves-
tigations into the UN's conduct in Rwanda and in 
Srebrenice.) 
During their meetings the delegation stressed how the 
'Act of Free Choice' - which led to West Papua's incorpora-
tion into Indonesia - had condemned the West Papuan 
people to more than three decades of brutality and repres-
sion at the hands of the Indonesian military, culminating last 
November in the assassination of independence leader, 
Theys Eluay [see separate article]. 
The campaign, organised following a decision taken at 
the Second International Solidarity Meeting on West Papua 
in Germany in October 2001, was launched simultaneously 
in several countries, including the UK, Ireland and 
Australia. It has been endorsed by 40 organisations around 
the world. 
UN complicity in 'Act of No Choice' 
Under an international agreement between the 
Netherlands (the colonial power) and Indonesia, brokered 
by the UN and the US in 1962 (the New York Agreement), 
the UN was under an obligation to 'advise, assist and partic-
ipate' in an 'act of self-determination in accordance with 
international practice', 
The act was conducted in 1969 by Indonesia, which had 
occupied West Papua since May 1963. International prac-
tice at the time required universal adult suffrage, but in the 
event, just 1,022 people, out of a population of around 
800,000, were forced to vote under duress for their country 
to become part of Indonesia. The process is known as the 
'Act of Free Choice', but to this day is condemned by West 
Papuans as the 'Act of No Choice'. 
In November 2001, the former UN Under Secretary-
General, in charge of the UN's mission in West Papua, 
Chakravarthy Narasimhan, condemned what happened as a 
'whitewash'. 
The documents presented to the UN in March were 
based on detailed research of hitherto classified official 
records by historian Dr John Saltford. They reveal the 
extent to which the UN turned a blind eye to the manipula-
tions of the Indonesian military in order to satisfy US 
requirements that the territory should become Indonesia's 
26th province. The US was desperate to satisfy Indonesia's 
claims ovef West Papua, to prevent Indonesia becoming a 
cold-war ally of the Soviet Union. 
A small UN team arrived in West Papua in 1968 to help 
Indonesia prepare for the promised act of self determina-
tion. By then-;' the West Papuans had already experienced 
five years of Jakarta's repressive military rule. One 
American diplomat noted that the Indonesians 'had tried 
everything from bombing to shelling and mortaring, but a 
continuous state of semi-rebellion persists'. The UN had 
acquiesced in its exclusion from West Papua between 1963 
and 1968 in clear breach of the New York Agreement. This 
meant there was no mechanism to safeguard the human 
rights and political freedoms guaranteed by the Agreement. 
The UN team was supposed to comprise at least 50 
members, but following pressure from Jakarta, the total 
never exceeded 16, including administrative personnel. 
Aware of their deep unpopularity, the Indonesians 
declared in January 1969 that a referendum was impractical 
because the people were too 'primitive'. They then selected 
1,026 or so West Papuans to act as representatives. of the 
population (four were unable to participate 'due to illness'). 
Rather than protest, the UN chose to co-operate. 
Unsurprisingly, given the level of intimidation, the West 
Papuan representatives unanimously declared their love for 
Indonesia and their desire to join the Republic. 
Despite the farcical nature of the process, there was no 
objection from the UN and little international interest. It is 
clear that the intention of the UN Secretary-General's repre-
sentative, Ortiz Sanz, had been to ensure that West Papua 
remained with Indonesia. The US embassy in Jakarta had 
noted in 1968: 
'He is therefore attempting to devise a formula for an 
"act of free choice" in West Irian which will result in affir-
mation of Indonesian sovereignty ... Ortiz recognizes that 
the problem facing both him and the GOI [Indonesia] is the 
risk that the Irian representatives, however they might be 
constituted, would vote against remaining in Indonesia. He 
concedes that it would be inconceivable from the point of 
view of the interests of the UN as well as GOI, that a result 
other than the continuance of West Irian within Indonesian 
sovereignty should emerge.' 
After the event, the British Foreign Office noted 'that the 
people of West Irian have no desire to be ruled by the 
Indonesians who are of an alien (Javanese) race, and that 
the process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free 
choice to be made.' 
Despite this, the UN General Assembly, with opposition 
from a small number of African countries, simply voted in 
November 1969 to 'take note' of a UN report of the Papuan 
declaration of loyalty, and with that the UN washed its 
hands of responsibility for the West Papuan people. 
continued on p 11. 
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Seminar on conflict resolution in Aceh banned 
A seminar which was due to take place in Banda Aceh on 4 May, to assess the progress in the 
resolution of the long-drawn-out conflict in Aceh was banned at the last minute by the Aceh 
chief of police, dealing a serious blow to freedom of expression. 
The one-day seminar on the topic, 'Bt.~Hcling a New 
Commitment in Aceh', was organised by ffi.e Aceh Civil 
Society Task Force and was aimed at discussing progress made 
so far in talks brokered by the Henri DutianL Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, and seeking way'.$.. . 6f bringing 
Acehnese civil society into the process. ':/. 
Another round of talks between the Indonesfan'government 
and GAM, the Fee Aceh Movement, was due to open in 
Geneva on 8 May. Until now, the talks have beene~clusively 
the domain of the two sides in the armed conflict. while civil 
society has been kept on the sidelines, altho'i,lgh the conflict 
impinges so profoundly on the lives of the pe6ple' of Aceh. 
The seminar was to have been addressed b>;,the vice-gover-
nor of Aceh and a representative of GAM, wh,ile representa-
tives from a number of NGOs from Indonesia and overseas 
who had come to Banda Aceh to attend a meetifii of SCHRA, 
the Solidarity Committee for Human Rights in Aceh on the 
following day, were eager to attend the seminar;as well. 
However, two days before the seminar wai scheduled to 
take place, the police started harassing the organisers, the vice-
govemor announced that he would not address the seminar, 
and the Kuala Tripa Hotel which had agreed to provide a meet-
ing place for the event, alJllounced that they had changed their 
mind. · .... 
On 3 May, hours before the seminar was due to open, the 
police sent a letter to the organisers to say that the event was 
prohibited, forcing the organisers to announce the cancellation 
of the seminar. In a statement to the press that was widely 
reported in the local and national press, the organisers said that 
they had decided not to go ahead in order to prevent acts of 
repression. Given the extremely tense atmosphere in Banda 
Aceh and throughout Aceh, such caution is fully understand-
able. 
The organisers said they had decided to hold the seminar in 
order 'to open up democratic space in Aceh, in our efforts to 
promote peaceful processes and to safeguard the interests of 
civil society'. The statement went on: 'It is in the interest of 
civil society that justice be upheld and a democratic society be 
realised, even though it is a fact that at present, democracy is 
not acceptable to all sides. Respect for freedom of expression 
in society must be the stepping stone for resolving the conflict 
in Aceh. Without this, democracy will be dominated by the 
Violence Mafia.' 
Ban condemned by non-Acehnese NGOs 
The police ban came under strong attack from non-
Acehnese NGOs who had sent representatives to Banda Aceh 
for the occasion. At a press conference held on 4 May under 
the chairmanship of Bonar Tigar Naipospos of Solidamor 
(Solidarity Without Frontiers), Hendardi, head of PBHI, a lead-
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ing Indonesian human rights advocacy institution, deeply 
regretted that laws were being used to trample on freedom of 
expression. He said that the letter from the police to the 
seminar organisers was 'an insult to the intelligence'. Ori 
Rahman, co-ordinator of Kontras, the Commission for the 
Disappeared and the Victims of Violence, attacked the 
authorities for duplicity, on the one hand allowing the talks 
to go ahead in Geneva, while denying the democratic space 
for Acehnese society to participate in the process. 
Liem Soei Liong of TAPOL challenged the Indonesian 
authorities for trying to tum the Aceh conflict into a domes-
tic issue. Globalisation of human rights means that places 
where serious human rights are taking place are by defini-
tion international affairs and international concern is more 
than justified. 
Non-Acehnese NGOs and individuals who were in 
Banda Aceh for the seminar and the SCHRA meeting 
included seven Indonesian NGOs, one from the US, two 
from Europe (including TAPOL), two from Australia, one 
from Japan and one from the Philippines. * 
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